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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (hereafter referred 
to as the GATT) is the cumulative result of a complicated web of international 
relations and competing views on the progression of the world trading 
system that compounded in the aftermath of the Second World War. The 
framework provided by this innovative document set the tone for multilateral 
commercial relations in the future, particularly with regards to reducing tariff 
and non-tariff barriers.1 While there is extensive literature on the nature of 
the GATT, as well as on its economic implications and legal texture, there is 
relatively little written about its negotiating history.  
In order to attain a comprehensive and nuanced appreciation of why 
the GATT was reduced into the particular form that it was, one needs to 
delve further into what drove the key players at the negotiating table to insist 
on including or excluding certain provisions. The emphasis here will be 
placed on the United States and on the United Kingdom, especially in 
respect of their heated debate over the most-favoured-nation principle and its 
exceptions. It is hoped that such an examination of the negotiating history of 
the GATT will reveal the disparate visions of the proposed multilateral trading 
system and speak to the key motivating factors which generated its final 
codification.  
While many important contributions were made by other countries, the 
United States and the United Kingdom were perhaps the biggest drivers 
behind the negotiations and had an unmatchable influence in determining 
the institutional structure and substance of the GATT.2 It becomes clear from 
an analysis of the negotiating history of the GATT that this transatlantic 
relationship contributed a great deal towards the formulation of the future 
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multilateral trade regime and, as such, constitutes a valuable topic of further 
study.  
Notable mainstream theorists such as John Gerard Ruggie recognise 
the importance of the most-favoured-nation principle and non-discrimination 
in underpinning the liberal international economic order which materialised 
and matured in the twentieth century, as well as the respective contributions 
of the United States and the United Kingdom in generating sufficient political 
impetus for the ultimate institutionalisation of the multilateral trade system.3 It 
will nevertheless be asserted in this dissertation that,  if one wishes to gain a 
more nuanced understanding of the significance of these principles 
underlying the GATT, more robust engagement is required with both the 
domestic experiences of the United States and United Kingdom as well as 
with pervasive international hegemonic dynamics as they manifested within 
the context of the GATT negotiations. 
More specifically, it will be argued that the United Kingdom and United 
States experienced divergent trajectories of growth following World War II 
and were able to exercise influence over the negotiations to a lesser or 
greater degree as hegemonic powers. The United States benefitted from its 
unprecedented economic progress and attempted to capitalise on its 
increasing influence to secure greater market access for its domestic 
producers. By comparison, the United Kingdom had suffered extensive 
losses and was in a period of restoration. It wished to retain its imperial 
preferences vis-à-vis the Dominions which it perceived as providing an 
advantage in international trade. Because neither nation was able to 
unilaterally monopolise the international policy space, and because of the 
acknowledgement that the interdependence necessitated by free trade could 
prevent future conflict, they would ultimately reach a negotiated compromise 
in the form of the GATT.  
In evaluating the negotiating history of the GATT, the domestic 
interests advanced by the key negotiating parties as well as contemporary 
hegemonic power dynamics, this dissertation will reveal the degree to which 
                                                     





the meaning of the legal text is both contested and historically contingent. It 
will further be argued that such an analysis, premised upon a historical and 
textual methodology, is particularly useful for highlighting how domestic 
tensions and hegemonic norms inform the codification of legal texts as well 
as their subsequent interpretation. The principle of non-discrimination as it 
manifests in the most-favoured-nation clause as well as the exception 
afforded for existing imperial preferences provide a useful lens through which 
to view such dynamics. 
The GATT was created in response to a very particular problem of 
wanting to circumvent the adoption of obstructive trade barriers in the 
postwar era and yet it has had continued significance up until present day.4 
In this regard, the theoretical positions adopted by policy-makers, the 
respective economic and political contexts of the key negotiating players as 
well as the personalities of the negotiators all played critical roles in the 
evolution of the text of the GATT. A failure to acknowledge and engage with 
such complexities deprives many mainstream analytical works of the 
nuances required to fully appreciate the significance of the principles 
emerging from negotiations. This dissertation will therefore argue that 
oversimplified analyses of legal texts should be eschewed in favour of 
critically engaging with the negotiating dynamics underlying such texts as 
well as with the domestic tensions experienced by the key negotiating parties 
and broader contemporary trends in international hegemonic power. 
 
1.2 Methodology and evaluation of sources 
 
It would seem appropriate to pause briefly and make a few short 
comments on the methodology used in the writing and research of this piece. 
In this regard, many different secondary sources which were produced 
during the period of the negotiations as well as in its aftermath were used to 
provide insight into the unique factors constraining or propelling the United 
                                                     




States and the United Kingdom respectively towards certain national and 
mercantilist goals.  
A great deal of credit must certainly go to Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. 
Mavroidis and Alan O. Sykes for The Genesis of GATT,5 one of the few 
works which dealt directly with the negotiating history of the GATT and which 
provided abundant guidance and inspiration in the drafting of this 
dissertation.  
It is unfortunate, and yet inevitable due to its scope, that this 
dissertation will not be able to give more than lip service to some of the 
complexities within the domestic territories of the United States and United 
Kingdom. Therefore, internal divergences shall only be mentioned where 
they are necessary to explain the motivating factors behind the formulation of 
the GATT. Similarly, with regards the beneficiaries of imperial preferences as 
well as the other key players at the negotiating table, relatively little attention 
will be paid to their diverse circumstances except insofar as it bears directly 
upon the negotiating history of the GATT.  
Indeed, there are limitations both in the players considered as well as 
the temporal arc included, the motivations for the latter being further 
elaborated upon in sub-chapter 1.4. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this 
dissertation will provide a platform for further research and shed light on 
some of the historical contingencies which moulded the course of the 
multilateral trading system. 
 
1.3 Assessment of the utility of historical analysis on legal texts 
 
Before tracing the historical evolution of the GATT, it is necessary to 
comment on why such an exercise is a useful addition to the existing 
analyses of the GATT. In order to do so, one must consider the manner in 
which legal texts reflect the negotiated stance of different hegemonic 
interests and their varying degrees of bargaining power within a particular 
historical period as well as the manner in which those dynamics evolve and 
                                                     




impact the text's ongoing interpretation. Authors such as Robert W. Cox 
draw attention to the pitfalls of considering international texts as universal, in 
the sense of reflecting universal norms and applying universally to all 
participating nations.6 Instead, it is submitted that the content of these texts 
is dictated by the interests of the dominant nations participating in the 
negotiations and the degree to which they are each able to exploit their 
power to secure provisions which align with their commercial and political 
objectives.7  
It will be argued in this dissertation that, if one wishes to gain insight 
into such power dynamics and the manner in which they are reflected in legal 
texts, it is necessary to assess both the historical context in which the text 
was drafted as well as the degree to which the text itself embodies 
intersectional meaning. In adopting a historical and textual methodological 
approach,  it becomes possible to deepen our understanding of various legal 
concepts in a manner not otherwise possible, and to enrich a multiplicity of 
different academic endeavours. 
In this sense, Ismail has commented on the importance of both history 
and ideas as tools of analysis.8 Similarly, Gramsci’s historical materialism, 
from which this dissertation takes a great deal of instruction, emphasises the 
dialectical relationship between ideas and material circumstances.9 In 
addition, Gramsci underlines the critical importance of not isolating ideas 
from their material circumstances and so paying due attention to hegemony 
as it manifests in both forums of political organisation and ideological 
trends.10 While Gramsci primarily focused on the state entity, authors such 
as Cox have extended his conceptual formula to the emergence of the 
international political sphere.11  
                                                     
6 Robert W. Cox The political economy of a plural world: critical reflections on power, morals 
and civilization (2002) 59; Faizel Ismail 'An empirical analysis of apartheid South Africa’s 
ideas and practices in the GATT: 1947 to 1994' (2015) 51. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Faizel Ismail 'An empirical analysis of apartheid South Africa’s ideas and practices in the 
GATT: 1947 to 1994' (2015) 19. 
9 Robert W. Cox ‘Gramsci, hegemony and international relations’ in Stephen Gill (ed) 
Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations (1994) 56. 
10 Ibid at 56. 




If one is to adopt Cox’s explanation of the nature of different world 
orders which are characterised by the jostling of different hegemonic forces, 
it would seem that such structural configurations are ultimately conditional 
upon the particular contextual environment in which they reside.12 One may 
extend such an understanding a step further by positing that legal and 
economic concepts, including the most-favoured-nation principle, are 
conceptualised and given real-world application in specific and characteristic 
ways because of this conditional existence.13 This subsequently has 
concrete implications for how different world forces interact with one another, 
and for how one ought to go about assessing such interactions. One may 
then describe legal concepts as both formed by and constitutive of social, 
political and economic forces.  
In order to shed further light on this relationship between concept and 
context, the historical analyst is expected to construct and interpret events of 
the past as part of a broader context with its contingent norms and 
behaviours.14 Evidence obtained from a particular period does not have a 
fixed meaning, but rather it encompasses and embodies intersectional 
meaning.15 Such meaning may be created by extratextual social, political 
and economic processes through which the textual source was constructed 
as well as through the subsequent act of interpretation.16 Adopting such a 
theoretical stance on the importance of context and intertextuality allows for 
the introduction and utilisation of a broader array of historical sources, 
including legal materials.  
In addition to considering historical context, assessing the contested 
manner in which texts are created is a similarly important avenue of study. 
Authors such as Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida have described texts 
as 'tissues of quotations.'17 In this sense, one’s interpretation of a text, in this 
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historical materialism and international relations (1994) 29. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. Beyond the great story: history as text and discourse (1997) 20. 
15 Ibid at 21. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Elizabeth A. Clark History, theory, text: historians and the Linguistic Turn (2004) 132; 
Roland Barthes Image, music, text (1977) 146, 159-160; Jacques Derrida ‘Semiology and 




case a legal text, cannot be isolated from the network of references which it 
echoes.18 Any attempt to grasp the meaning of the text will necessarily 
involve a collaborative effort in which meaning will develop and morph in 
contact with the reader.19 To provide even more specificity, it is possible to 
consider Bakhtin’s language dialectics to elaborate upon how understanding 
constitutes the coming together of the given text, past contexts (including a 
text’s origins) and the anticipation of a future context in which the text is 
taken further in light of something the reader considers important.20 
It would therefore appear that legal texts, as with other historical 
sources, are subject to the tension between the historical contingency of their 
production as well as the adaptive nature of their subsequent interpretation 
and ultimate meaning, if one can speak of such a thing. Studying this 
interplay promises to reveal new insights into the significance of the text, the 
purpose for which it was formulated as well as the manner in which its 
interpretation has developed over time. This dissertation will focus on the 
insights gained in applying this historical and textual approach to the 
negotiating history of the GATT. 
Analytical exercises of this nature could indeed be applied to 
numerous examples of international economic or political negotiation to 
demonstrate, in a Gramscian sense, the degree to which theories are always 
produced by individuals within a given political, spatial and temporal 
environment and in furtherance of a particular objective.21 Such an 
interpretation, however, needs to be qualified by a recognition of the 
limitations of determining authorial intention.22 While such an exercise may 
certainly provide useful insights and possible interpretations, such efforts 
cannot be held out as the single, conclusive determination.  
                                                     
18 Elizabeth A. Clark History, theory, text: historians and the Linguistic Turn (2004) 133. 
19 Ibid. 
20 M. M. Bakhtin Speech genres and other late essays (1986) 161 as quoted in Raya A. 
Jones ‘Towards dialogic epistemology: the problem of the text’ (2017) 14 4 Qualitative 
Research 457 at 470. 
21 Op cit note 12 at 24. 




In addition, one cannot simply look at a series of discrete historical 
events and the actions of individuals within that series.23 Rather, one ought 
to consider the aggregate of those social interactions and how they operate 
within certain overarching structures as a foundation for fruitful analysis and 
a rejection of more reductionist techniques.24 This author has chosen the 
negotiating history of the GATT as a worthwhile subject of study because of 
the uniquely volatile context from which it arose but there are surely many 
other options to which such academic treatment could be extended. With a 
focus on methods of knowledge production and their manifestation in 
applicable legal concepts, this dissertation will attempt to assess the 
negotiating history of the GATT and its crucial most-favoured-nation clause 
in a holistic and thorough manner.25 
 
1.4 The significance of the historical period chosen as the subject of 
analysis 
 
With reference to Braudel’s concept of historical patterns of change at 
the level of the longue durée and l’histoire événementielle, one may situate 
the emergence of the GATT both within the slow-moving development of 
global trade and the internationalisation of knowledge production as well as 
within the more rapid succession of events in the aftermath of World War II.26 
This will encompass significant structural changes such as, 'the spreading 
and deepening of commodification and monetisation of social relations,'27 as 
well as more  temporally-isolated incidents. In this regard, Chapters 3 and 4 
will develop the idea of the emergence of the GATT as a result of historical 
change at the slower tempos of longue durée and as well as hone in on the 
quicker rhythms of l’histoire événementielle which focus on the 
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consequences of individual events and, on an even more microscopic scale, 
on individual personalities.28 
It is hoped that the exercise of positioning the GATT and the most-
favoured-nation clause within its relevant historical context and the different 
rhythms of historical change will provide a key of sorts to unlock a more 
thorough and substantial understanding of their relative importance as well 
as their contemporary meaning.29 While the introduction of an apparent new 
world trading order might appear to be the result of an eruption of short-
acting, dynamic forces, there are slower moving currents which underlie such 
developments and which deserve analytical attention. As Braudel has 
described, 'the problem for anyone tackling the world scene is to define a 
hierarchy of forces, of currents, of particular movements, and then tackle 
them as an entire constellation.'30 
While this approach may instinctually lend itself to a comparison with 
more recent interpretations of the text, the scope of this dissertation limits the 
evaluation of the GATT within the context of its conception. 
 
1.5 Overview and organisation of dissertation 
 
In order to pursue the argument that greater academic attention ought 
to be paid to both the historical context in which legal texts are created and 
the hegemonic power dynamics which inform their eventual codification, it 
will be necessary to begin by laying the theoretical foundations for such an 
approach and considering the specific ideas which characterised the GATT's 
negotiating history and the emergence of the multilateral trading system 
more generally. Having highlighted the key narratives espoused by the 
negotiating parties and their hegemonic underpinnings, the emphasis will 
shift to an overview of the historical period in which the GATT emerged and 
the progression of the drafting process itself. The significant features 
identified therein will subsequently be analysed and the relevant nuances 
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unpacked in greater detail in order to demonstrate the utility of such an 
approach. 
More specifically, Chapter 2 will consider the conceptual 
underpinnings of the multilateral trading system and its theoretical 
justifications. This chapter will include a brief assessment of the general 
trends observed in the historical progression of international trade so as to 
better situate the codification of the GATT within its broader context. In doing 
so, it will be pertinent to reflect upon the appropriateness of using the most-
favoured-nation principle as the subject of a stereoscopic study of multilateral 
trading relations, and its potential for exposing implicit power dynamics.  
In Chapter 3, the emphasis will shift towards the specific historical 
context of the postwar period, with special attention being paid to the 
respective trajectories of the key negotiating parties in the context of their 
negotiations on the GATT, culminating in its codification at the Geneva 
conference. This chapter will begin by assessing the tentative steps taken 
following World War I towards more comprehensive international 
cooperation, the political and economic ramifications of the Great Depression 
and the regressive effect of the protectionist stances adopted by many during 
the interwar period. Such themes feed into the perceived role of the most-
favoured-nation principle in maintaining world peace. Subsequently, it will be 
necessary to evaluate the international reaction to the Second World War 
and the political calculations involved in adopting the Havana Charter. This 
chapter will then further engage with the negotiations as they unfolded in the 
postwar period. 
Chapter 4 will, in turn, hone in on the specific negotiating history of the 
GATT by examining the debates pursued by the American and British 
negotiators in respect of the ambit of the most-favoured-nation clause as well 
as the anticipated role of imperial preferences within the multilateral trading 
system. Briefly, this legal text was the result of a number of different drafting 
processes aimed at preparing appropriate legal instruments to regulate both 




Tariffs and Trade.31 The political impetus generated as a reaction to the two 
world wars manifested in a genuine willingness to liberalise international 
trade by eliminating arbitrary trade restrictions and providing mechanisms to 
enable further negotiation on the reduction of trade barriers.32 Unpacking 
such debates and the degree to which the major negotiating parties were 
either willing to compromise or stuck steadfast in their position will illuminate 
competing visions of future trading relations and their underlying motives.  
In Chapter 5, the nature of these debates and their impact on the final 
formulation of the most-favoured-nation principle and its exceptions will be 
critically assessed in light of the aforementioned historical context and power 
dynamics. It will further be argued that such an assessment highlights the 
importance of questioning the neutrality of assumptions underlying the 
international trade framework and of always situating concepts within their 
specific context. For example, consider the utility of the argument that the 
motivation for many nations to create the GATT was based on its potential to 
achieve equilibrium in respect of terms of trade externalities through the 
reciprocal reduction of trade barriers as well as to provide governments with 
binding commitments to counterbalance against the demands of domestic 
interest groups.33 In order to unpack each of these nuances, it is necessary 
to go beyond a superficial textual interpretation and, instead, critically 
engage with the nature and influence of incumbent hegemonic influences 
and the extent to which their manoeuvrings inform the meaning of the text. 
Chapter 6 will conclude this dissertation and briefly retrace the 
formative aspects of its argument while making a few rudimentary comments 
on the developing interpretation and perceived state of the most-favoured-
nation principle today and how this potentially provides an opportunity for 
future research. 
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2.1 Introduction to the theories underlying the negotiating history of the 
GATT 
 
In order to begin understanding the significance of the agreement 
reached in the GATT negotiations, it is appropriate to highlight some of the 
key themes which emerged and assess the degree to which they gained 
support from the respective negotiating parties and were in turn advanced or 
defended by such parties. Engaging in such an academic exercise shall 
deepen our understanding of the codification of the GATT by revealing the 
interplay between the domestic experiences of the negotiating parties and 
their conduct on the international stage. 
The importance of ideas in formulating the multilateral trading system, 
as well as the historical context of such ideas, cannot be overstated.34 At the 
most rudimentary level, one ought to briefly consider the origins of the 
concept of ‘international’ so as to better assess the particular arguments put 
forward by the negotiating parties to the GATT.35 Gill describes this concept 
as reflecting a self-governing 'inter-state system' which appears to operate 
with its own modes of production and exchange, and yet is influenced by the 
domestic experiences of the participating states.36 This necessarily entails an 
interaction between the 'national' and 'international', implying a degree of 
embeddedness of international structures in more domestic social relations 
of power.37 This is a theme that will emerge quite clearly in the discussion of 
the American and British domestic contexts and how their political structures 
and dynamics of popular opinion would come into play in the process of 
negotiating the future multilateral trade regime.  
In this respect, consider how Richard Gardner summarised the 
fundamental issue underlying the negotiations as identifying, 'how to devise 
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international arrangements benefitting not just the world community as a 
whole but each of its parts.'38 Rather than polarising the Anglo-American 
interactions as being premised upon fundamental differences of economic 
opinion, the emphasis should additionally be placed on how these major 
negotiating parties were able to reconcile different economic factors with 
their respective domestic political environments which encompassed diverse 
public opinion, strong-willed parliamentary influence and various procedural 
limitations.39 That is, the domestic situations of the United States and United 
Kingdom, in addition to their economic development and the policy positions 
of leading trade negotiators, influenced the course of the GATT negotiations 
and thus ought to form part of any substantive analysis of the historical 
progression of the multilateral trading system. 
In addition to such domestic tensions which feature in the trajectory of 
international decision-making, one ought to assess the role of emerging 
hegemonic powers as they interacted on an international scale. Indeed, the 
transitional period in which the GATT was formed cannot be divorced from 
the more broadly changing patterns of identity formation which saw a shift 
towards greater integration of society within the international space and the 
gradual dissolution of more bounded concepts of territorial interests.40 Rather 
than purely transplanting domestic issues into an international context, new 
narratives emerged as a result of the creation of several significant 
international forums. The acceleration of economic integration, for example, 
was guided by and rationalised through postwar concepts of world peace 
being best served by the interdependence of nations.41  
The narratives so often vocalised by both the United Kingdom and the 
United States reflect their reaction to the fallout of both world wars. However, 
their debate over the necessity and specific form of the international 
organisation best suited to addressing this fallout can also reveal a great 
deal about more extensive, transnational patterns of hegemonic power. 
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Reacting to the transformation of the world order, one might speak of the 
creation of a new global society which emphasises the globalisation of 
certain ideals.42 From the perspective of the student of history, there is a 
clear need to approach such transformation, not through a static, bounded 
conception of historical structures which isolates domestic and international 
developments, but rather through dialectical and integrative methods of 
analysing changes in social and political structures.43 
If one is to take a closer look at hegemony on an international level, it 
is necessary to begin by outlining hegemony as an accumulation of certain 
values and norms about the political or social order which are accepted by 
many without much questioning.44 This may be powered by the dominant 
social strata who widely accept these values and norms.45 Thus Gill argues 
that changes in society and in the stability of the political and economic 
international order are the result of the interrelationship between structure 
and a miscellany of events as they manifest at a particular historical 
juncture.46 In order to develop a hegemonic order, states need to establish 
and defend a particular global political and economic regime which is 
universally conceived of as being aligned with the values and interests of 
most actors.47 This would operate on the level of co-ordinating inter-state 
relations within a global mode of production.48 
Cox identifies states which have established such hegemonies as 
having themselves experienced a socio-economic overhaul which has both 
internal consequences for the state’s structure but also external influences 
which ultimately extend their domestic hegemony outward.49 As will become 
clear from the discussion in Chapter 3, the core of world hegemony at the 
time of the formulation of the GATT was represented by the United States 
and in that sense one must view the GATT's negotiating history as an 
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example of the extension of American hegemonic power, albeit not without 
some limitations. In considering the manifestation of the 'globally-conceived 
civil society,'50 one ought to consider the intellectual strata of the United 
States and the United Kingdom and their reception of different ideas 
regarding the prospective format and content of the GATT as reflective of the 
dispersion of certain hegemonic ideologies.51  
One method by which hegemony is established is through 
international organisations which create hegemonic institutions and 
ideologies that themselves infiltrate internationally and connect various 
national modes of production.52 Of particular interest for this dissertation is 
the manner in which they produce and promote standards that serve the 
development of the hegemonic world order.53 Institutions, such as the GATT, 
are both the result of hegemonic norms as well as a further facilitator of such 
norms through the legitimisation of certain policies and practices favourable 
to dominant forces.54 An intriguing point made by Cox in his description of 
international organisations as facilitators of hegemony is that such 
organisations are often capable of and expected to accommodate exceptions 
or revisions for certain counter-hegemonic notions.55 In the context of the 
creation of the GATT, as well as subsequent debates regarding the degree 
to which the GATT can accommodate the interests of developing nations, 
Cox's point on the role of counter-hegemonic influences is very interesting. 
While subsequent chapters will engage in a more thorough analysis of 
the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, it 
suffices to comment briefly that the United States was generally considered 
to be responsible for driving the establishment of the GATT and therefore the 
hegemonic world trade order.56 It did, however, require the assent and 
acquiescence of other nations, in particular the United Kingdom as it similarly 
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occupied a hierarchically-dominant position.57 While the support of other 
nations was sought, the decision-making was heavily dependent upon the 
United States and the United Kingdom which is why the scope of analysis in 
this dissertation is limited to these two negotiating parties.58  
Having assessed some of the literature on both the significance of 
domestic experiences and international hegemonic powers in the historical 
development of the multilateral trading system, it now becomes appropriate 
to examine how this interaction of different forces emerged by briefly tracing 
the fluctuating patterns of trade liberalism and the manner in which the 
United States and the United Kingdom featured within these patterns as their 
hegemonic roles evolved. 
 
2.2 Historical patterns of trade liberalism and the hegemonic roles of 
the United Kingdom and the United States 
 
Gill and Law identify two historical periods which they offer as distinct 
examples of 'regimes of accumulation.'59 The first is the consolidation of 
British hegemony with the commercial influence of the gold standard and the 
second is the rise of American global power after 1945 accompanied by the 
introduction of the Bretton Woods institutions.60 With regards to the latter, 
one of the key initiators for such global power was the creation of institutions 
to govern the world order, at least in respect of more capitalist-leaning 
nations, which ensured relative stability for the core.61  
This development was supported by a significant degree of overlap of 
certain values, norms and institutions within leading capitalist countries, in 
keeping with the notion of 'embedded liberalism' which characterises how 
various nations approach multilateralism as being rooted in 'domestic 
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interventionism.'62 The outward expansion of this group of forces created 
many formal and informal postwar alliances, most centring around the United 
States as the seat of hegemonic power.63 The creation of this 'international 
historic bloc' constitutes the background upon which the GATT was created 
and should at all times be considered as a relevant informing factor for the 
interpretation of the text of the GATT.64 It should nevertheless be noted that 
this requires more thorough engagement than is ordinarily adopted in 
mainstream works on significant events in the liberal international economic 
order and, as such, key features including domestic factors and international 
relationships of power should not be overlooked in favour of reductionist 
narratives.  
Rather than understanding this dynamic as simply the co-operation of 
certain capitalist interests across national territories, one ought to look into 
domestic social and political institutions and civil society which perceived 
such shared values as legitimate.65 Indeed, that will form part of the analysis 
to come which will look at increasing international economic integration and 
its proposed regulation by the GATT from a domestic perspective. This will 
shed light on how the negotiations around the GATT were influenced by the 
varying degrees of legitimisation of certain ideas at a domestic level and how 
political actors who attempted to stamp their mark upon the emerging world 
order were either restrained or given mandate by domestic demands.66  
It should be noted that there is an additional nuance to be considered 
here. One cannot assume that the professed concerns of nations 
participating in the negotiations aligned wholly with actual domestic opinion. 
Indeed, Cox and Ismail have criticised such assumptions for failing to 
account for the degree to which domestic practices departed from these 
ideas.67 In embracing this nuance, one is able to unearth discrepancies 
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between the ideals professed by participating nations and the reality of their 
domestic practices.68 For example, authors such as Mazower are able to 
consider such discrepancies in their investigations into the history of 
multilateralism and to expand upon such observations in assessing official 
statements and proclaimed economic or political motivations.69 The 
significance of such discrepancies lies in what they reveal about the tensions 
that are presumably brought to bear on textual and policy-related 
negotiations. 
With regards to this relationship between domestic contexts and the 
nature of participation in international forums, Ismail posits an interesting 
argument that the mechanism of free trade is used by nations who are 
experiencing strong economic growth because greater access to world 
markets advances their interests.70 The United States surfaced from the 
Second World War boasting a comparatively strong economy and began 
pursuing a multilateral trading system.71 Rather than simply ascribing to the 
idea of 'embedded liberalism,'72 this argument provides a more solid platform 
from which to understand the motivating factors behind the evolution of the 
multilateral trading system.73 This would certainly help explain why the 
United States remained committed to protecting certain sensitive economic 
sectors and yet continued to play the proponent of free trade in the GATT 
negotiations.74 As the strongest international economic actor, they stood to 
gain a great deal from opening up trade and yet they remained careful to 
protect those sectors, particularly agriculture, which were economically or 
politically sensitive.75 
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Notably, authors such as Friedrich List appear to express support for 
this theory by arguing that such nations which are experiencing strong 
economic growth started off using protectionism and state intervention and, 
only when their economies had grown sufficiently, began espousing the 
importance of free trade.76 In that sense it has been said that, 'when anyone 
has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he 
has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after 
him.'77  
List describes the United Kingdom as taking exactly this approach in 
the nineteenth century, even going so far as to abolish the importation of 
goods from its colonies if they threatened domestic industries.78 However, as 
British manufacturers improved their capabilities there was a greater 
willingness to accommodate freer trade.79 Perhaps the most commonly cited 
example of this transition was the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.80 From 
that point onwards, free trade policies were increasingly adopted across the 
European continent, mostly facilitated by bilateral treaties, and the British 
benefitted from having increased access to those markets.81 One such treaty 
which facilitated this increased trade liberalism was the Cobden-Chevalier 
(UK and France) Treaty of 1860.82 The real impact of this treaty was in its 
inclusion of a clause extending most-favoured-nation treatment as well as in 
its disruption of European protectionism by prompting continental European 
nations to seek reciprocal concessions from France.83 As the European 
nations began entering into more commercial treaties, the most-favoured-
nation clause was increasingly adopted to promote non-discrimination in 
trade.84  
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This period of free trade, however, did not last as Germany as well as 
other European countries began returning to protectionist trade policies 
which largely remained in place until World War I.85 It has been suggested 
that this was predominantly a result of Germany’s emergence from the 
Franco-Prussian war in 1871 and the alliances which arose thereafter, as 
well as the colonial land grab in the late 1800s.86 With respect to Germany 
more specifically, initial calls from the iron and steel industry for greater 
protection of domestic markets were ignored by conservative politicians who 
largely hailed from agricultural backgrounds and it was not until an 
agricultural crisis arose because of escalating American competition that the 
manufacturers calling for greater domestic protection gained traction.87  
These tariff reforms adopted by Germany in 1879 are now 
retrospectively seen as a turning point in tariff history.88 In response thereto, 
France began increasing tariffs to further its own agricultural protection.89 
Germany, owing to the end of the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty and the 1891 
famine, soon began to retreat from its protectionist stance so as to find 
markets to accommodate its expanding industry as well as to secure food by 
liberalising imports and making some small concessions in a series of new 
treaties.90 Nevertheless, owing to Germany’s unwillingness to make any 
significant concessions, this did not have a far-reaching impact in terms of 
liberalising trade more generally across Europe and Germany’s move was 
later reversed in the early twentieth century.91 This was accompanied by 
Russia, Austria and Switzerland all raising their tariffs to compete with 
Germany.92 The implication was that, at the onset of the First World War, 
most of continental Europe had adopted a strongly protectionist stance.93  
The United Kingdom maintained its free trade economic policy, but 
most other countries perceived this as being motivated purely by self-interest 
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and were not as willing to replicate their tariff reforms.94 Indeed, the growing 
competition from other European countries in Africa and the influence of 
increased protectionism in Europe did push the United Kingdom towards 
seeking preferential access for her territories.95 The United Kingdom began 
putting in place preferential agreements with its colonies using, for example, 
the Sugar Convention of 1902 which, 'prohibited the entry of bounty-fed 
sugar from Prussia, Denmark, Spain, and the Argentine.'96 While the 
campaigning of 1903 to put in place a protection of 10 per cent on 
manufactured goods and implement retaliatory measures to ensure 
increased access for British goods did not ultimately come to fruition, the 
evidence of some small shift towards protectionist thinking is clear.97 
The United States followed a similar trajectory, albeit in a different 
temporal context.98 That is, the United States also began transforming its 
previously protectionist trade policy to accommodate the notion of free trade 
when its economy became more competitive and it sought to benefit from 
having increased access to global markets in the late 1930s.99 Indeed, from 
the time of Hamilton’s term as the secretary of the Treasury in the late 
eighteenth century until the commencement of the Second World War, the 
United States had predominantly maintained its infant industry protection 
model through the institution of high tariffs on imports to safeguard domestic 
industries.100  
In the early twentieth century, the United States as well as many 
continental European countries were moving towards more protectionist 
economic stances and, with the unsettling of trade networks as a 
consequence of extensive international conflicts, the possibility of imposing 
free trade policies seemed remote.101 There was greater state intervention in 
the market to avoid importing from or exporting to non-allied countries.102 
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The use of joint committees by the allies to purchase important goods by 
pooling their imports is one example of the more noticeable presence of the 
state in commercial activity.103 The interwar period was similarly typified by 
heavily protectionist policies.104 The political reorganisation of Eastern 
Europe, the steadfast protection afforded to wartime industries as well as the 
safeguarding of replacement industries created overseas to substitute goods 
previously bought from Europe all contributed towards the perceived need for 
more protectionist foreign policy.105 While non-tariff barriers were gradually 
reduced following the First World War, there was a simultaneous rise in 
tariffs.106 
The United Kingdom, once the bastion of free trade, moved away from 
its previously liberal policies and instead developed the Commonwealth 
System of Imperial Preferences which was aimed at increasing the number 
of goods subject to tariffs.107 Similarly, once Germany regained autonomy it 
started raising its tariffs.108 The United States, beginning with the Emergency 
Tariff Act of 1921, also brought on a series of tariff increases which many 
thought to be inappropriate because the United States was a substantial net 
creditor.109  
The cumulative effect of the unstable economic and political 
conditions also prevented the reintroduction of trade treaties which had 
played such an important role in global commerce in the early twentieth 
century.110 By extension, the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause fell 
into disuse and discriminatory trade practices became increasingly 
common.111 By 1929 it seemed clear that the United States intended on 
raising its already high tariffs and protectionist tendencies in other countries 
remained strong.112 Curzon describes how, 'as the year proceeded, 
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depression, and the deconsolidation of duties and denunciation of treaties, 
set in.'113  
Following the Wall Street crash, there was a decline in American 
demand with American funds being removed from overseas which 
accompanied a downturn in producing countries and a decrease in European 
industrial production.114 The cyclical pattern of falling demand, declining 
prices and the stagnation of foreign trade had significant ramifications for 
balance-of-payments issues.115 This was further intensified by countries 
adopting protectionist trade policies and implementing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers in an attempt to insulate themselves against the plummeting demand 
and fluctuating prices.116 Such measures, most famously characterised by 
the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, were received with retaliatory responses.117 
The United Kingdom similarly introduced protective mechanisms through the 
vehicle of the Import Duties Act in 1932 and, most notably, abandoned the 
gold standard resulting in extreme volatility in exchanges.118 Wilcox 
commented that support for the tenets of economic liberalism, which had 
already suffered a major loss of approval during World War I, were further 
eroded by the Great Depression.119  
By the mid-1930s, it seemed that the world was beginning to recover 
from the impact of the Great Depression and world industrial production was 
steadily improving.120 Nevertheless, very little had been done to restore trade 
integration because of the uneasy global political environment.121 It is within 
this context that the United States, under the guidance of Cordell Hull, 
introduced the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 which made use of 
an unconditional most-favoured-nation clause and provided mechanisms that 
generalised tariff concessions made in pursuit of boosting exports.122 In 
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doing so, a decisive step was taken towards promoting free trade which 
would grow in significance following World War II.123  
This shift in policy was thought to be motivated by the United States’ 
economic strength, reflected in their large proportion of world production and 
exports which required additional demand from overseas markets.124 By 
comparison, the United States imported very few goods, the result of which 
was that there was a dollar shortage in the international market and some 
nations were forced to restrict their importation of American goods.125 Many 
felt, therefore, that the Western European market ought to be reconstructed 
through the development of an institution promoting trade liberalisation which 
would improve market access.126  
Nevertheless, as has been discussed above, the United States still 
tended towards applying protectionist policies vis-à-vis particularly sensitive 
domestic industries, despite its growing support of free trade policies on the 
international stage.127 In addition, in spite of securing concessions on many 
goods, this was not sufficient to spark off a significant move towards trade 
liberalisation as the more general tendency towards keeping trade 
restrictions in place would continue up until the Second World War.128 
Despite the inclusion of a most-favoured-nation clause in the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act, the United States was not willing to extend 
concessions arrived at bilaterally to the world.129 
Attitudes would, of course, begin to shift during World War II, but the 
overview outlined above does lend weight to the notion that historical 
patterns of trade liberalism mirror, at least to a degree, the emergence of 
hegemonic nations as they experience economic development and can 
dictate the openness of international markets and yet still reserve sufficient 
policy space to protect domestic interests.  This correlation is useful to the 
extent that it demonstrates the importance of critically evaluating the nature 
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of hegemonic power dynamics as it reveals a great deal about why nations 
participate in international negotiations in the manner that they do. This is 
significant for the purposes of this dissertation as it supports the submission 
that the text of the GATT cannot be divorced from the historical 
circumstances in which it was drafted and, as such, any academic 
consideration of the GATT's provisions ought to assess the impact of such 
circumstances on the meaning of the text. This is particularly true of the 
most-favoured-nation principle as well as of non-discrimination in trade more 
generally as they are perhaps most ostensibly reflective of the negotiated 
compromises reached amongst hegemonic interests. 
 
2.3 The most-favoured-nation clause as an instrument of hegemonic 
interests 
 
The GATT proposes that the multilateral trade project is primarily 
aimed at,  
'raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 
developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding 
the production and exchange of goods … by entering into reciprocal 
and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce.'130  
Generally speaking, it has been argued that the most fundamental 
principles underlying the GATT and the system of multilateral trade are non-
discrimination, reciprocity and free trade.131 Ruggie’s description of the ideas 
involved in the development of multilateral institutions in the postwar period 
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is of particular interest here.132 He suggests that multilateralism essentially 
involves the coordination of relations between multiple states according to 
certain doctrines.133 Perhaps one of the most significant of such doctrines 
may be the most-favoured-nation principle. In comparing bilateral trade 
agreements entered into under Hitler’s Germany with the most-favoured-
nation treatment afforded by the GATT, Ruggie comments that the former 
were innately discriminatory in that the agreements were only created in 
respect of specific products in specific instances where an advantage could 
be obtained.134 By contrast, with the GATT's most-favoured-nation clause, 
tariff reductions are extended to all other member states.135 This 
demonstrates, at least in some sense, the significance of the specific 
formulation of the most-favoured-nation clause which was incorporated into 
the final text of the GATT, and how it reflects contemporary sentiments 
shared by the major negotiating parties. 
The essence of the most-favoured-nation principle is that countries 
apply the most favourable duties to each other’s goods in order to ensure 
non-discriminatory market conditions.136 Curzon describes these as, 'the 
lowest duties applied by either and the most advantageous trading 
conditions, whether at the time of concluding the undertaking or treaty or at a 
future date.'137 This was the mechanism through which equal access to 
markets was sought by nations such as the United States.138 Echoes of this 
motivation can be found in the United States’ "Proposals for the Expansion of 
World Trade and Employment" which identified various factors limiting free 
trade and which will discussed further in Chapter 3.139  
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Article I of the GATT prescribes that unconditional, most-favoured-
nation treatment be extended to all member states.140 It follows then that 
quantitative restrictions, bilateralism and other commercial policies which 
extend preferences are not wholly consistent with a framework which 
espouses non-discrimination in trade.141 Because of the nature of the GATT, 
there is very little room to evade the implications of most-favoured-nation 
treatment except by absconding from the entire institution of the GATT itself 
and it is unlikely that a nation would forfeit all the other tariff concessions 
from which it may benefit simply to avoid having to grant most-favoured-
nation status in respect of one tariff heading.142  
There are certain recognised exceptions of which the most notable for 
our purposes is the accommodation of preferences already existing at the 
time the GATT was signed.143 Imperial preferences are perhaps the most 
controversial example wherein the United Kingdom retained certain 
preferences in its Dominions.144 These imperial preferences were eventually 
accepted by the American negotiators during the Geneva conference in a 
desperate attempt to save the GATT project.145 Their inclusion in the final 
codification of the GATT is a consequence of the extended debates between 
the key negotiating parties which resulted in the United States allowing this 
preference to be included conditional upon the United Kingdom’s agreement 
not to further increase those preferences.146  
Interestingly, in agreeing to this preference cap, the United Kingdom 
could not even raise tariffs on goods which had been traditionally duty-
free.147 Because most goods imported from Commonwealth countries were 
duty-free, should the United Kingdom wish to change this duty-free policy it 
would need to enact a legislative amendment which in turn required 
Parliamentary approval, such approval being extremely difficult to obtain 
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given contemporary political dynamics.148 The necessary implication of this 
was that a substantial portion of the United Kingdom’s tariffs were bound.149 
This restricted their ability to increase most-favoured-nation rates where their 
trade policy demanded it and where their commitments under the GATT 
made it possible.150 This would later be revised by special waiver when it 
was recognised that the United Kingdom was being prevented from 
exercising its full rights under the GATT.151 
The degree to which states, such as the United Kingdom, practically 
embraced non-discrimination in trade is a point of debate. Indeed, studies 
such as the one conducted by Patterson show that trade discrimination was 
still rife in this period following World War II and many nations failed to truly 
observe the most-favoured-nation clause when dealing with certain special 
economic or political interests.152 Thus there seems to be a discrepancy 
between theory and practice which can, to an extent, be explained by the 
malleability of the most-favoured-nation clause.  
In this regard, note that the Economic Committee of the League of 
Nations commented that, 'when world trade is following an upward course, it 
will be found that the system of equality of treatment is established or re-
established all along the line, whatever the theories in favour at the moment. 
When world trade declines, on the contrary, the clause suffers with it.'153 The 
implication is that, as Curzon has argued, the most-favoured-nation clause 
can heighten the effects of either an increase or decrease in world trade.154 
The Cobden-Chevalier Treaty, for example, is widely perceived as being 
responsible for the lowering of tariffs throughout Europe as many countries 
were prompted by the agreement to seek out agreements with France to 
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reduce trade obstacles.155 In this scenario, the most-favoured-nation clause 
appears to have played a role in expediting tariff reductions.156  
It could, however, be argued that the most-favoured-nation clause 
was instead implicated in the rising protectionism which followed the Great 
Depression.157 This is because of the disinclination of parties to allow others 
to obtain unrequited benefits from concessions made between two trading 
partners which led to, 'a freezing of the then existing situation or even to 
increases in tariffs equally and indiscriminately applied to everyone.'158 With 
the multilateral character of the GATT, however, such concerns would largely 
be assuaged as the benefits to be derived from concessions made by other 
countries were more widely accessible owing to their inclusion on the list of 
negotiable tariff rates.159 
On the one hand, it has been suggested that the most-favoured-nation 
clause encourages higher tariffs because of the assumption that, for it to be 
accepted, tariffs would need to be sufficiently high to 'keep the most efficient 
producer at bay.'160 This has a negative impact on less economically efficient 
countries who are less capable of bearing the additional tariff burden.161 The 
idea that concessions would be automatically granted to third parties who 
were seen to not have reciprocated sufficiently is another perceived 
argument identifying the most-favoured-nation clause as a factor which 
discourages negotiation and encourages protectionism.162 This was certainly 
an opinion held by many in the interwar period.163 Indeed, many thought that 
the most-favoured-nation clause encouraged nations to simply wait for others 
to negotiate tariff reductions so that they would automatically benefit from 
such developments without having to make any reciprocal concessions.164 
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On the other hand, most proponents of the impact of the most-
favoured-nation clause instead argue that no party would be willing to reduce 
their tariffs unless they were confident that it would not be undermined by the 
granting of greater tariff concessions to his trading competitor.165 This 
argument, which Curzon terms 'avoidance of nullification,'166 is thought to 
dispel all arguments to the contrary.167 Indeed, it is generally thought that 
eliminating differential duties prevented the use of tariffs in a retaliatory 
manner.168 Simply put, the most-favoured-nation clause favours the most 
efficient producers to the benefit of consumers which is one of the underlying 
arguments in support of free trade more generally.169 With the gift of 
hindsight, it appears that the most-favoured-nation clause has proved fit-for-
purpose in its application within the multilateral context where it has been 
able to prevent the distortion of trade through discrimination.170 
What becomes clear is that the most-favoured-nation clause has 
served many different purposes in the history of trade liberalism and, owing 
to its malleable nature, has been favoured as a tool of different hegemonic 
interests. Indeed, the aforementioned example wherein the negotiating 
parties disagreed about how to interpret the scope of the most-favoured-
nation clause in light of pre-existing imperial preferences is indicative of the 
degree to which each perceived the importance of the clause's subsequent 
application in the future multilateral trading system.  
The general principle of non-discrimination in trade as well as the 
most-favoured-nation clause provide a useful lens through which to assess 
the manner in which legal texts are contingent upon the domestic interests of 
the negotiating parties as well as their respective power to pursue such 
interests on the international stage. It therefore remains to further evaluate 
the negotiating history of the GATT in a more concerted manner to determine 
what it reveals about the context in which the most-favoured-nation clause 
                                                     









was formulated and to take note of the nuances which can be uncovered 




3.1 Overview of different historical periods of hegemonic power 
 
This chapter will begin by revisiting the key historical periods in which 
the two major negotiating parties experienced a significant shift in their ability 
materially to influence the international commercial narrative. This will 
provide a useful background within which to contextualise the subsequent 
consideration of both the interwar and World War II periods in the remaining 
sub-chapters. These sub-chapters will focus on tracing the origins of the 
GATT to demonstrate how the United States and United Kingdom's disparate 
views in respect of the proposed world trading order reflected their 
experience of divergent domestic tensions. It is hoped that this will showcase 
the utility of exploring the negotiating parties' pursuit of certain national and 
mercantilist interests and how this adds greater nuance to an analysis of the 
ultimate codification of the GATT. 
While it is possible to trace many different historical cadences of 
hegemonic power, for the purposes of this dissertation what is most relevant 
is the three periods identified by Arrighi and Gill which usefully capture the 
transition from early British hegemony between 1845 and 1875 to American 
hegemony following World War II.171 In respect of the first period, the United 
Kingdom benefitted from playing a prominent market role, from overseeing 
the international monetary system and from having sufficient credibility to 
assert the legitimacy of its interests in international expansion.172 This period 
is characterised by the liberalisation of trade which was justified on the basis 
of the central argument in The Wealth of Nations that free trade would bring 
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greater prosperity for all and which allowed the United Kingdom to 
legitimately implement doctrines of free trade in pursuit of British 
supremacy.173 
In the second period which endured from the late 1800s up until the 
end of the Second World War, the balance of power was much less stable 
and more countries began to vie for supremacy with the result being an 
uptake in conflict, the most dramatic examples of which are the two world 
wars.174 Unlike the free trade regime observed in the first period, nations 
shifted to more protectionist foreign economic policies with, for example, the 
gold standard being abandoned.175 This situation could not continue 
indefinitely and a new hegemony began to materialise towards the end of the 
Second World War.176 During the third period, the United States would then, 
from 1945 onwards, lead the restructuring of the world order in a similar 
manner to the United Kingdom's rise to power in the nineteenth century, 
albeit in the context of a far more complex and interconnected world.177 
It is within this transitional period between the second and third 
periods that one can situate the negotiating history of the GATT and it is 
within that timeframe that our subsequent discussions will be focused. 
Against the backdrop of the United States' rise to hegemonic dominance, it 
will be possible to assess the manner in which the GATT negotiations 
provide insight into the United States' growing interests and whether they 
aligned with the interests of the United Kingdom which had emerged from the 
periods of international conflict in a much less favourable condition and 
which hoped to consolidate its existing trade privileges. In taking cognisance 
of the two countries' different trajectories, one can gain further insight into 
what motivated their respective pursuits of certain policies in the context of 
the interwar period as well as during World War II and its aftermath. 
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3.2 The interwar period 
 
World War I constituted an understandably jarring setback following 
which governments were to slow to recede wartime controls on international 
trade.178 The interwar period is of particular significance for our purposes 
because of the impact of the Great Depression and the rise of totalitarian 
states on subsequent attempts to foster international economic 
cooperation.179 In assessing the interwar period, it will become clear that, 
despite its earlier tendencies to revert to protectionist economic policy, the 
United States would begin to pursue freer trade policies more vigorously as 
its economy recovered from the Great Depression. The emergence of 
political forums focused on international commercial stability, the change in 
the American political administration and the influence of policy-makers such 
as Cordell Hull would transform the United States' approach to international 
trade.180 By contrast, the United Kingdom was consolidating its imperial ties 
and began to retreat from its previously liberal trade regime. The diverse 
nature of the United States and United Kingdom's trajectories would be 
reflected in their respective positions at the GATT negotiations. 
As has been mentioned above, the United States' foreign policy had 
been previously characterised by its economic protectionism and political 
isolationism.181 This began to evolve during the interwar period, primarily 
owing to its developing economy and relative strength within the international 
order. The United States’ remarkable shift from upholding more isolationist 
policies to undertaking to lead the new international order marked an 
important transition in the general attitude towards international commercial 
relations and was symptomatic of the rise in American supremacy.182 
One of the most significant events that occurred during the interwar 
period was the creation of the League of Nations which sought to prevent 
future international conflict. In keeping with this narrative, it was suggested 
                                                     
178 Op cit note 1 at 149. 
179 Ibid at 145. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Op cit note 38 at 1. 




that economic recovery ought to be promoted through forums such as the 
World Economic Conference of 1927 and that economic interdependence in 
pre-empting and preventing military conflict ought to be considered as a 
potential model for future international interactions.183 Indeed, there were 
some discussions within the context of this Conference on the importance of 
tariffs and the most-favoured-nation principle.184 However, ultimately, few 
practical consequences flowed from such discussions and the ability of 
international trade to be used as a mechanism for conflict prevention was not 
to be realised.185 
The subsequent descent of the world economy into recession and the 
government-sanctioned protectionist response prompted the onset of the 
Great Depression in the early 1930s.186 This was further exacerbated by the 
tendencies of governments to fortify their domestic industries by increasing 
trade barriers.187 Consider the example of the United States which 
implemented the Smoot-Hawley tariff, sending already prohibitive tariffs even 
higher and prompting other countries to follow suit.188 Even the United 
Kingdom, which had traditionally favoured free trade policies, introduced 
emergency tariffs during 1931 and put into force the Import Duties Bill in the 
following year.189 Such efforts to protect balance of payments and increase 
domestic economic activity were similarly enacted across many different 
countries.190 
One notable development that arose during this period was the 
preferential tariff arrangements between the United Kingdom and its 
Dominions which were settled at a conference in Ottawa in 1932.191 These 
arrangements afforded preferential tariff treatment to goods coming from 
countries within the Dominion and imposed prohibitive duties on those goods 
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coming from elsewhere.192 Indeed, many argue that the Ottawa agreements, 
coupled with more general increases in tariffs imposed on American exports, 
were implemented by nations responding to the Smoot-Hawley tariff which 
was extremely unpopular internationally.193 This system of imperial 
preferences was hotly contested in the negotiations preceding the final 
codification of the GATT as the United Kingdom wished to maintain this 
preferential treatment, much to the consternation of the United States. 
Indeed, some within the American administration saw such preferences as 
causing unacceptable injury to American exports and, despite attempts being 
made at forming an agreement to curb the discriminatory effect of these 
tariffs, the commencement of World War II rendered any progress 
ineffective.194  
A loosely comparable situation arose in central Europe where Nazi 
Germany began creating a trade bloc of its own by establishing bilateral 
clearing arrangements with nearby countries to the benefit of Germany.195 
Such arrangements had the effect of disrupting the trade system which had 
pre-existed the First World War and which was beginning to experience a 
resurgence in the interwar period.196 Despite such concerns being vocalised 
at international forums such as the World Economic Conference in 1933, 
insular protectionist policies retained a stronghold to the detriment of the 
economic system and political stability.197 
Following the administrative change in the United States in 1932, tariff 
negotiations gained momentum with the signing into law of the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934 which provided that, where a bilateral trade 
agreement incorporated an unconditional most-favoured-nation clause, 
American tariffs may be reduced by a maximum of 50 per cent.198 This 
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began opening up trade by reducing the influence of the American Congress 
in setting duties.199  
One of the key players motivating this policy shift was the Secretary of 
State under the Roosevelt administration, Cordell Hull, whose experiences in 
World War I impressed upon him the value of curbing economic rivalry in 
order to prevent war.200 In this regard, Hull commented that long-lasting 
international peace is closely intertwined with, and dependent upon, free 
trade.201 He initially advocated for the unilateral reduction of American tariffs 
and an unconditional most-favoured-nation clause aimed at eliminating 
sanctions, preventing export subsidisation and removing the United 
Kingdom’s imperial preference system.202 He would later abandon his 
position on the unilateral reduction in tariffs and instead begin to focus on 
reciprocity in trade.203  
Hull's stance on the importance of free trade and the best manner in 
which to implement it would subsequently influence the American State 
Department’s policy position following World War II which was aimed at 
curbing trade restrictions in order to achieve enduring peace.204 Indeed, the 
consequences of Hull's work would extend beyond his retirement in 1944 
and filter into the discourse in the negotiations of the GATT.205 The 
experience that American trade officials gained through negotiating the 
reciprocal trade agreements of the 1930s under Hull would prove to be an 
important advantage in the postwar period when it came to deciding upon the 
future multilateral trading system.206 Indeed, some have proclaimed that, 
'Hull was the most important individual responsible for what ultimately 
became the GATT.'207  
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The United States' about-turn in respect of the nature of its trade 
policy, prompted by its economic growth and internal political changes, was a 
significant development in the interwar period. The manner in which it later 
pursued this agenda is testament to its burgeoning economic and political 
power and yet it was still somewhat constrained by the United Kingdom's 
dogged commitment to its imperial preferences. The nature of these tensions 
will be further explored in sub-chapters 3.3 and 3.4. 
 
3.3 The onset of World War II 
 
Upon the commencement of the Second World War in September 
1939, the United States was in an uncertain position with the American 
public having little appetite for military confrontation and the government 
needing to prioritise the continued survival of the United Kingdom.208 The 
proposed course of action was to provide economic support through the 
Lend Lease program which facilitated the transfer of necessary supplies to 
the United Kingdom as well as other allied nations.209 This was put into force 
in March 1941 and provided that reimbursement was to be in the form of an 
unstipulated, non-monetary benefit.210 The nature of this reimbursement 
would be revealed after the Second World War when it became possible for 
the United States to cash in on its claim by securing agreements from the 
United Kingdom to participate in the new international economic order.211  
In particular, the United States wished to use its economic strength to 
eliminate the imperial preferences enjoyed by the British in respect of their 
Dominions.212 It was thought that their superior bargaining power could be 
used to coerce the United Kingdom into discarding these preferences.213 
This particular issue came to a head in 1941 when the United Kingdom's 
Treasury, under the leadership of John Maynard Keynes, attempted to evade 
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any concrete economic policy commitments.214  Such efforts proved to be 
futile as the draft aid agreement given to Keynes provided that defense aid 
was conditional upon eliminating discriminatory trade restrictions.215 This did 
not go unnoticed by the British who initially resisted what they perceived to 
be a forced imposition of unilateral obligations.216 
What is significant about this exchange is the competing ideas 
communicated about the countries’ respective visions for the future of 
international trade. Without reading too much into the comments made by 
the officials, the United Kingdom exhibited less appetite for establishing a 
more liberal trade regime than the United States.217 This logically flows from 
the strategic advantage each stood to gain from such a system and is 
similarly reflected in the GATT negotiations where each country tried to 
capitalise upon their relative power to ensure their particular vision and 
interests were safeguarded. 
The internal politics of the United Kingdom at that particular juncture 
go some way towards explaining the response of Keynes to the wording of 
the draft aid agreement. Keynes himself had acknowledged the domestic 
divisions stemming from divergent positions on whether to accept free trade 
as an objective or to control imports, and on whether imperial preferences 
could legitimately retain a position in the postwar period.218 Keynes was 
inclined towards greater import control but deliberately distanced himself 
from old forms of trade discrimination.219 He commented on, 'all the old 
lumber, most-favored-nation clause and the rest which was a notorious 
failure and made such a hash of the old world.'220  
Keynes felt that government regulation of the domestic economy and 
of international trade was necessary, particularly in order to improve 
employment statistics.221 Keynes’ inclination towards not relying on market 
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forces to keep the economic system in balance and instead allowing greater 
government intervention is clear from his own academic contributions.222 In 
his work, Keynes argues that,  
'We do not wish…to be at the mercy of world forces working out, or 
trying to work out, some uniform equilibrium according to the ideal 
principles… We wish…to be our own masters, and to be as free as we 
can make ourselves from the interferences of the outside world.'223  
Keynes' position differed from the American view which prioritised 
nondiscrimination and endorsed minimal governmental regulation.224 The 
core of this difference of opinion was something that would be echoed in 
subsequent meetings.225 For example, in a meeting in August 1941 where 
Presidents Roosevelt and Churchill would eventually sign the Atlantic 
Charter, this debate over the extent to which the United Kingdom would 
compromise on its position vis-à-vis imperial preferences was revisited.226 A 
clause was ultimately included which provided that the parties will endeavor 
to liberalise trade and to improve market access, albeit while respecting 
existing trade obligations.227 This amounted to allowing the United Kingdom 
to retain its imperial preferences, to the dismay of Hull and others.228  
These conflicting views would not be easily reconciled, particularly as 
the British were in no hurry to confine their future postwar policies and did 
not view Hull’s position as representative of the majority of the Roosevelt 
administration.229 The internal instability and divisions within Churchill’s 
coalition government made it politically undesirable to pursue the elimination 
of imperial preferences as part of the Anglo-American Mutual Aid 
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Agreement.230 Despite this perception of nondiscrimination being a personal 
fixation of Hull and the State Department, there was in fact widespread 
resentment towards the British imperial preference system which was later 
reiterated by President Roosevelt himself.231 Gradually, this impasse in the 
negotiations dissipated culminating in the signing of the Anglo-American 
Mutual Aid Agreement in February 1942 with article VII prescribing that 
discriminatory trade treatment be removed and tariff and non-tariff barriers 
reduced.232 Divergent interpretations of this provision and the extent to which 
the United Kingdom had bound itself to eliminating imperial preferences 
would plague Anglo-American negotiations for years to come as both nations 
began trying to develop the foundations of the future multilateral trading 
system.233 
What is useful to note is that there were a myriad of factors which 
impacted these debates over the interpretation of art VII, including theoretical 
disagreements about the substantive issues at stake, different internal 
political contexts influencing respective negotiating positions as well as 
personality dynamics.234 In respect of the negotiating teams, each was 
supported and instructed by different government departments and 
committees which aimed to advance specific interests that aligned with their 
institutional mandate.235 There were similarly conflicting ideological positions 
on what the postwar world ought to look like.236 Furthermore, there were 
tensions between, on the one hand, more progressive economists and civil 
servants formulating opinions and engaging in negotiations, and, on the 
other hand, political officials who were hamstrung by party interests, electoral 
concerns and lobbyist groups and who ultimately had the final decision-
making power.237 It is through an analysis of domestic factors such as these 
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that one is fully able to appreciate the significance of the negotiated 
compromise which resulted in the codification of the GATT.  
For example, consider the Division of Commercial Policy and Trade 
Agreements and its relationship with more politically-attuned parts of the 
State Department.238 The former made concerted efforts to reduce obstacles 
to trade which were sometimes met with resistance by other government 
agencies.239 The latter, by contrast, was in a much more precarious position 
and had to be sensitive to Congress’ stance on trade policy as well as to 
competing party interests.240 On an alternate level, it could be said that, 
generally speaking, the Democrats tended to favour the reduction of trade 
barriers and the Republicans instead preferred policies effecting the retention 
of protectionist tariffs.241 At this time, Congress was led by a Democrat 
majority, allowing the Roosevelt and Truman administrations to fulfill their 
policy objectives.242 However, critically, the Republicans obtained a majority 
in Congress near the end of 1946.243 This would have important ramifications 
for the 1947 Geneva conference.244  
In the United Kingdom, trade policy had to be implemented by 
consensus obtained at the Cabinet.245 During the wartime period, the 
coalition government comprised of Labour and Conservative ministers who 
unsurprisingly held divergent views on trade policy, the result of which was 
that Churchill had to carefully negotiate any proposed changes.246 Unlike the 
American presidents who predominantly enjoyed the support of Congress, 
Churchill had to compromise on many policy agendas in order to 
accommodate and placate the more protectionist-swayed Conservative party 
as well as the Labour party whose objectives included trade expansion and 
socialism.247 Another prominent domestic figure in the United Kingdom was 
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the Board of Trade which formulated economic policy and which participated 
in any negotiations related thereto.248 It was predominantly headed by 
Labour ministers such as Hugh Dalton and Sir Stafford Cripps.249  
In addition, the Economic Section of the War Cabinet Secretariat 
participated in strategising British trade policy insofar as it supported the 
Board of Trade by providing advice.250 The Economic Section was comprised 
of notable academics including James Meade who often participated in 
negotiations with the United States.251 Meade was an important figure who 
became the head of the Economic Section in 1946 and who advocated for 
the establishment of an international economic body in the postwar period to 
eliminate political sources of conflict.252 The work of the Board and the 
Economic Section in trying to liberalise trade was met with criticism from 
Keynes and the Treasury.253 While the Treasury was predominantly 
concerned with the balance-of-payments issue, Keynes was ultimately not 
convinced of the benefits of having a multilateral trading system.254 Finally, 
one ought not to overlook the role of the Dominions Office in promoting the 
interests of the former colonies and regulating imperial preferences.255  
This brief exposition of the internal conflicts and multi-layered 
decision-making institutions of the United States and United Kingdom 
exposes the complexity at play at the domestic level which would affect 
negotiations between the nations.256 Even more interesting is the degree of 
influence which certain individuals played in the GATT negotiations.257 Such 
individuals were often academics or civil servants who had novel ideas about 
the anticipated character of the postwar trading system and who could 
engage with their counterparts across the negotiating table.258 Such 
influence was mitigated by the powers of political superiors who struggled to 
                                                     
248 Op cit note 1 at 382. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid at 394. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid at 390; James Meade The economic basis of a durable peace (2012). 
253 Op cit note 1 at 394. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid at 398. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid at 410. 




come to agreement because of the constant need to prioritise sensitive and 
diverse domestic interests.259 This is evident in interactions between officials 
such as Sir Stafford Cripps and Will Clayton who butted heads over tariffs 
and imperial preferences at the 1947 Geneva Conference.260 
After the signing of the Atlantic Charter and later the Anglo-American 
Mutual Aid Agreement, further progress was sought on the topic of what the 
international system of commerce and trade would practically look like.261 
One of the first opinions drafted on this topic emphasised the importance of 
securing the support of the United States for, 'a multilateral system of open 
trade, convertible currencies, and limited exchange-rate flexibility.'262 This 
proposition was taken up by subsequent academics such as Meade who 
explained that the United Kingdom also had a great deal to benefit from the 
liberalisation of trade.263 The international system Meade foresaw would be 
accessible for all nations who agreed to comply with the membership 
standards, would prohibit discrimination in trade (except for imperial 
preferences) and would remove protectionist trade barriers.264 Trade 
discrimination would only be permitted against non-member states and in 
favour of certain recognised groupings of states, i.e. in the context of imperial 
preferences.265  
Meade’s proposals were eventually given to the Board of Trade and 
endorsed by the Overton Committee.266 The Committee similarly commented 
on the importance of expanding trade by reducing trade barriers, eliminating 
quantitative restrictions and preventing the introduction of new trade 
preferences.267 It was further added that it would be preferable to actively 
pursue these objectives in a timeous manner while there was strong political 
                                                     
259 Op cit note 1 at 407. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid at 412. 
262 Ibid at 416; Alec Cairncross and Nita Watts The economic section, 1939–1961: a study in 
economic advising (1989) 96. 
263 Op cit note 1 at 419, 423. 
264 Ibid at 427.  
265 Ibid at 430. 
266 Ibid at 439. 




will to do so.268 While these changes found support amongst the staff of the 
Economic Section and the Board, they were criticised amongst members of 
the government and the Treasury.269 Keynes, for example, condemned the 
report as going too far in its endorsement of free trade, and instead 
maintained that trade controls and exchange restrictions should be used in 
pursuit of full employment.270 Others, such as Sir Hubert Henderson, 
commented on how important it was to remedy the British balance-of-
payments problems and asserted that preferential, discriminatory trade 
arrangements may be useful in the postwar period.271  
Despite such objections, the Overton proposal eventually gained 
traction, albeit in a more diluted form produced by the Hurst Committee.272 
The memorandum produced was then put before the War Cabinet which 
decided upon the multilateral reduction in trade barriers more broadly, 
qualified by the availability of using quantitative restrictions to remedy 
balance-of-payments issues.273 With regards imperial preferences, no 
definitive decision was made.274 This was ostensibly because of the need to 
first consult with the Dominions, but practically was more likely a response to 
the Conservatives' strong opposition to eliminating imperial preferences.275 
After having contacted the Dominions, Canada, having an interest in 
retaining American and British market access, expressed its support for the 
proposal.276 By contrast, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand expressed 
a preference for bilateral trade negotiations.277 
Interestingly, at around the same time, the United States had not 
made as much progress with regards to its development of commercial 
policy, and it still seemed to want to initiate bilateral trade arrangements with 
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specific countries rather than adopt a multilateral approach.278 However, the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was renewed in 1943 which gave greater 
impetus to the State Department to overhaul its trade policy.279 This, together 
with the fact that the United Kingdom had already consulted with the 
Dominions, meant that in 1943 talks relating to postwar trade policy were 
revived.280 
The Washington Seminar took place in late 1943 and a British 
delegation, including figures such as Keynes and Meade, travelled to 
Washington to engage in preliminary, informal talks on postwar economic 
policy with American officials such as Harry Dexter White and Harry 
Hawkins.281 While there was some tension in the discussions regarding the 
proposed regulation of exchange rates and international payments, there 
was greater consensus on the subject of international trade and reducing 
trade barriers.282 With regards to tariffs, the United States maintained their 
preference towards engaging in bilateral negotiations to reduce tariffs for 
specific products but the British officials were increasingly able to convince 
them of the merits of a more multilateral approach.283 Imperial preferences 
also featured as one of the more sensitive topics for discussion.284 The 
United States persisted in trying to persuade the United Kingdom to 
completely eliminate imperial preferences but the British officials remained 
firm in resisting such advances, reasoning that their strong ties to the former 
colonies and the complex domestic position could not be so easily 
sidestepped.285  
In October 1943, the parties formulated a joint statement which 
established the foundations upon which a commercial agreement would 
eventually be created.286 Of course, at the political level, further discussion 
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was still required.287 In the United States, the State Department published its 
"Interim Report" which reaffirmed the importance of enforcing non-
discrimination in international trade.288 The British influence on American 
thinking could be seen in the shift away from bilateral negotiations and 
towards a more multilateral approach.289 This Report as well as the 
negotiations at the Washington Seminar would form the basis of the State 
Department’s subsequent efforts to establish more detailed and 
comprehensive proposals to be dealt with on the international stage.290 
The 1944 Bretton Woods conference marked another significant plot 
point in the negotiations preceding the formulation of the GATT.291 There the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund were created with the intention 
that they would address many of the economic concerns of the postwar 
period, in particular developing institutions capable of dealing with balance-
of-payments lending as well as providing assistance for development and 
reconstruction.292 On the topic of trade, an ambitious project was initiated to 
develop an international trade organisation but negotiations were stalled and 
for over a year little progress was made.293 This was mostly due to the British 
negotiators who, despite having expressed support for a multilateral trade 
system, were struggling to garner domestic consensus because of the 
controversy surrounding imperial preferences as well as the desire of some 
to retain quantitative restrictions to remedy balance-of-payments issues.294 It 
was felt that the potential gains from such a trade organisation would not be 
sufficient to make up for the loss of their preferential trading relationships 
with the Dominions.295 Pressnell describes how the more the negotiations on 
the trade proposals were stalled, the more opportunity there was for 
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opposition in the United Kingdom to develop, particularly amongst the 
Conservatives.296  
What emerges from contemporary narratives is that the United 
Kingdom wanted the United States to substantially reduce its tariffs before it 
would seriously consider the reduction or elimination of imperial 
preferences.297 Perhaps it was thought that this would be sufficient to quell 
fears about the arrangement being disproportionately favourable to the 
United States.298 Nevertheless, the Commonwealth countries, bar Canada, 
continued to express reluctance about doing away with imperial 
preferences.299 An additional concern, most famously expressed by Keynes, 
was that the proposed policy would not allow the state to utilise quantitative 
import controls.300 The British negotiators used this lack of consensus as a 
bargaining tool in further discussions by emphasising the degree to which 
they were domestically constrained.301 It seemed less and less likely that 
these policy proposals would be realised.302 
The United States were frustrated at this lack of progress but 
continued to work on various proposals under the guise of the newly 
appointed Committee on Trade Barriers.303 The Committee created a draft 
convention which proposed that the United States should seek the reduction 
of tariffs by 50 per cent with the allocation of a five year period in which any 
substantial injury to a particular industry caused by greater import volumes 
could be addressed by the implementation of import quotas.304 Furthermore, 
it was proposed that there would be an elimination or reduction of tariff 
preferences and an abolition of quantitative restrictions.305 The United States’ 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, publically discussed how critical reform of 
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the prewar trade barriers was to the expansion of trade and to the facilitation 
of employment.306  
Transatlantic talks resumed in December, 1944 and British officials 
expressed satisfaction at the proposals put forward by the Americans, in 
particular because of the compromises met on employment and quantitative 
restrictions as well as on the concessions made in respect of the removal of 
imperial preferences.307 However, beyond the economist officials, there was 
still an unwillingness by decision-makers to wholeheartedly commit to the 
United States’ proposals.308  
The nuances revealed by evaluating domestic divisions, internal 
decision-making structures and the influence of key policy-makers are 
extremely insightful in respect of which interests would be stubbornly 
defended or easily abandoned as the negotiations unfolded and the 
implications thereof for the drafting of the text. It is now appropriate to 
engage in a similar exercise in respect of the developments in the postwar 
period. 
 
3.4 World War II draws to a close 
 
In early 1945, it seemed an end to the war in Europe was in sight and 
yet there was no set commercial policy in place to govern trade in the 
aftermath of the conflict.309 This period was characterised by notable 
changes in American and British personnel which had implications for the 
manner in which negotiations would proceed.310 In the United States, Cordell 
Hull retired and Will Clayton was appointed in his place to take up the cause 
of trade liberalisation.311 In addition, in April 1945, President Truman was 
elected as the new leader of the United States.312  
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Following World War II, the British coalition government was 
disbanded and the Labour party won the July 1945 elections with Clement 
Attlee taking the helm.313 Under the Labour government, there was a greater 
emphasis placed on, 'economic planning and full employment.'314 Hugh 
Dalton, who had served at the Board of Trade and who had promoted the 
notion of a multilateral trade system, became the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.315  
Despite the fact that all of these uncertainties and shifts in personnel 
could easily have disrupted the negotiations on trade policy, there was 
remarkably little change in position on either side of the debate.316 If 
anything, the United Kingdom's Labour government was more willing to 
consider the multilateral approach to trade than the previous incumbent.317 
The Labour government was also relatively indifferent towards imperial 
preferences but, nevertheless, found it difficult to garner sufficient popular 
support for their elimination.318  
Notably, the American State Department needed to renew the 
mandate to negotiate under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.319 
Securing this mandate was particularly important because it framed the 
manner in which tariffs were to be negotiated in the aftermath of the war.320 
The decisions made in this regard about the percentage of tariff reductions 
provides insight into their commitment to expanding international trade.321 On 
the question of whether reductions of up to 50 per cent could be 
implemented on a selective or general basis, some hesitation was shown 
and ultimately it was decided that selective reductions would be 
preferable.322 There were fierce debates on this in Congress and the Senate 
with Republicans expressing concern over the potential impact on domestic 
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industries.323 The renewal of negotiating authority was nevertheless passed, 
facilitating the possibility that a 'multilateral-bilateral approach' be adopted 
which allowed countries to negotiate bilaterally in respect of specific product 
categories with the principal suppliers of that product.324 The tariff agreed 
upon would then be applicable in respect of all member states by virtue of 
the application of the most-favoured-nation clause.325 
The United Kingdom was dissatisfied with this 'multilateral-bilateral 
approach.'326 Their concerns were primarily that the proposed bilateral 
negotiations would be time-consuming and complex and that they were less 
palatable than a simple, uniform reduction in tariffs.327 The United Kingdom 
compiled a "Draft Statement of Principles" in response thereto which 
emphasised the benefits of having an international trade organisation 
premised on multilateral trade negotiations.328 Hawkins of the United States 
expressed his hope that, despite the position in the United States, a small 
aggregation of the larger trading nations could negotiate bilaterally and, in a 
sense, achieve something akin to uniform tariff reductions.329 
Canadian officials similarly expressed disappointment at the adoption 
of the 'multilateral-bilateral approach.'330 Their suggestion, which in hindsight 
would have far-reaching ramifications, was that tariff negotiations should be 
undertaken with a small nuclear group of states so as to prevent the dilution 
of commitments if dealing with a number of countries.331 This suggestion 
would later influence American policy and the Executive Committee on 
Economic Foreign Policy began expressing support for this so-called 
'selective nuclear multilateral-bilateral approach.'332 This entailed a small 
group of countries meeting together to negotiate bilaterally for the reduction 
of specific tariffs, before approaching the general international conference.333 
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The suggestion initiated the idea that an institution akin to the GATT would 
be a good starting point before establishing a fully-fledged International 
Trade Organisation (hereafter referred to as the ITO).334 Later that year, the 
American proposals were put to British officials who, again, were resistant to 
many aspects of the envisaged tariff negotiations, in particular the separation 
of preferences from the general category of tariff reductions as well as the 
proposed stance on import quotas and export subsidies.335  
In August 1945, President Truman unexpectedly ended the provision 
of aid to Britain and its allies, creating panic amongst the British who were 
concerned as to how they would remedy their balance-of-payments deficit.336 
Attempts were subsequently made to try and secure another loan from the 
United States, without making any assurances on trade policy.337 This was 
unsuccessful and the United States pushed for more developments on the 
trade policy front.338 Initially, an agreement was reached on the need for tariff 
negotiations to be held in early 1946 as well as for a more general 
conference to be held on trade and employment.339 Once again, the most 
controversial issue continued to be imperial preferences, and some 
American officials felt that American aid ought to be conditional upon the 
elimination of imperial preferences.340 Others took a softer line on the issue 
of preferences out of concern for the potential backlash from the United 
Kingdom.341  
Negotiators from the United Kingdom were unwilling to kowtow to 
these demands and insisted that preferences should be negotiated 
separately in the future subject to a reciprocal reduction in the United States' 
tariffs.342 Arguments about resistant domestic opinion and stalling tactics in 
the form of consulting with the Dominions were used to avoid entering into 
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any substantial commitments.343 Ultimately, the United States would 
backtrack on their assertions of requiring the elimination of imperial 
preferences before they would grant aid and instead they accepted that 
preferences could be discussed in the context of trade barriers more 
broadly.344 It was conceded that such agreements on reducing tariffs on a 
most-favoured-nation basis would, by extension, lessen the significance of 
preferences.345 This is a particularly good example of how the major 
negotiating parties' respective bargaining power shaped the nature of free 
trade commitments. In considering such nuances, one is able to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the GATT's implications. 
Following such progress, the United States pushed for further 
advancement in the negotiations on trade policy in the form of a joint 
proposal.346 This proved simpler than earlier discussions on financial 
assistance because there was more widespread agreement and, where 
there were small divergences in opinion (i.e. in respect of state trading and 
export taxes), the American trade officials were willing to compromise and 
acquiesced to the demands of the United Kingdom.347 The United Kingdom's 
Cabinet accepted the policy agreement on 6 November 1945 and, later that 
year, the details of the United States' loan to the United Kingdom were 
settled.348 The statement issued by Prime Minister Attlee and President 
Truman reflected their approval of the developments made in creating the 
foundations of an international trade system premised upon multilateralism 
and non-discrimination.349 
After a great deal of stagnation in negotiations, the abovementioned 
decisions provided momentum for the multilateral trade project.350 The State 
Department publically produced a document called the "Proposals for 
Expansion of World Trade and Employment” identifying factors which 
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restricted international trade, including government-imposed and private 
trade restrictions.351 The Proposal indicated that a conference should be held 
in 1946 to discuss how to deal with barriers to trade.352 Many countries 
agreed to attend this conference, including Australia, Canada, China, 
France, India, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the 
United States amongst others.353  
In February 1946, it was suggested by the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations that a conference on trade and employment be 
established and a charter created to establish the foundations for the future 
ITO.354 It was envisaged that these preparations would operate in 
conjunction with the aforementioned group of countries who were negotiating 
tariffs.355 The negotiators would develop an international instrument which 
would indicate the commitments they agreed upon, and this would later be 
put to a wider international conference.356 It was thought that a protocol on 
specific tariff reductions would be annexed to the Charter for the ITO, and 
such tariff schedules would have a multilateral effect.357 The United States 
proposed that this protocol be put into force before the Charter.358 
However, the meeting of the aforementioned countries did not occur 
as scheduled, predominantly due to the United States’ State Department 
being unable to comply with the procedures required by the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act for tariff negotiations.359 Ultimately, with the anticipation that 
domestic interests may lobby against cutting certain tariffs and the upcoming 
Congressional elections in November 1946, the United States made the 
decision to delay the conference until 1947.360 Despite concerns about losing 
momentum, the State Department utilised the reprieve to work on the 
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specific provisions of a draft charter and to test their popularity amongst the 
participating nations.361  
Canada expressed unconditional support for the draft and the United 
Kingdom only objected to the extent that the charter diverged from the earlier 
Proposal.362 Issues regarding preferences were raised again, with New 
Zealand expressing concern about foregoing its preferential treatment in the 
United Kingdom’s market.363 The United Kingdom, by contrast, was more 
inclined to consider negotiating on preferences if met with a strong 
commitment from the United States that they would reduce their tariffs.364 In 
response to some of these concerns, the United States drafted the 
"Suggested Charter."365 
A preparatory meeting aimed at making arrangements for the 
subsequent conference on the ITO was convened in London in October 
1946 and, for the first time, negotiations were extended to include nations 
such as Australia and India.366 This more extensive participation provided 
further insight into what such a multilateral trade agreement might look like 
and more diversified criticisms of the "Suggested Charter" were also put 
forward.367 Canada and Australia, for example, expressed their disapproval 
of the lack of strong commitments to reduce tariffs on agricultural 
products.368 
Interestingly, there was already an awareness of the fact that 
developing countries were concerned about whose interests the agreement 
would serve.369 The aim of such developing countries has been described as 
wanting to redirect the participating nations' focus towards ensuring that 
developing nations be allowed to continue using quantitative import quotas to 
protect more vulnerable industries, to promote employment and to foster 
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economic development.370 The outcome of their efforts was that additional 
chapters were added to the draft charter dealing with these issues.371 This is 
one of the first instances where talk emerged about having an exception for 
developing countries, in particular allowing them to continue using 
quantitative restrictions as they 'caught up' with more industrialised 
nations.372  
The outcome of the meeting was that there was widespread 
agreement on the draft ITO Charter as well as on the regulation of a number 
issues including state trading and restrictive business practices.373 It was 
thought that this updated document better represented the interests of all 
participating nations and in that sense had a truly international character.374 
Crucially, agreement was reached on the importance of having a provisional 
agreement (eventually known as the GATT) which would come into force 
before the ITO Charter.375 
The first comprehensive draft of the GATT was created by a UN 
drafting committee in early 1947 which took inspiration from the parts of the 
draft ITO Charter which pertained to trade policy.376 It was thought that 
producing such a text would guarantee the enactment of the tariff 
concessions agreed upon.377 The nature of the document was therefore 
somewhat different to the aforementioned Charter which focused more on 
internal domestic policies.378  
An additional preparatory meeting was scheduled to occur at Geneva 
in April 1947.379 Despite the Republicans obtaining a majority in Congress in 
the elections and expressing concerns about the effects of tariff reductions 
on domestic producers, the meeting was able to go ahead on the basis of 
certain concessions being made.380 These concessions included the 
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provision of a procedure for domestic companies to file complaints where 
foreign competition was adversely affecting a particular industry because of a 
reduction in tariffs.381 This procedure effectively provided the United States 
with the ability to revoke or change concessions made if they caused serious 
injury to domestic producers.382 While some Republicans felt that this 
procedure did not go far enough, it was sufficient to placate both parties and 
to allow the Geneva Conference to commence as planned.383 In fact, 
President Truman noted the importance of the impending conference when 
he said, 'The success of this program is essential to the establishment of the 
International Trade Organisation [and] to the strength of the whole United 
Nations structure of cooperation in economic and political affairs … The 
negotiations at Geneva must not fail.'384 
The purpose of the meeting at Geneva was twofold.385 Firstly, further 
work was to be done on the draft ITO Charter so that it would be ready to be 
put forward for ratification at the UN conference in Havana.386 Secondly, 
further tariff negotiations would be pursued and the proposed interim 
document (i.e. the GATT) would be finalised.387 The main negotiators and 
decision-makers were Will Clayton and Clair Wilcox who represented the 
United States and Sir Stafford Cripps and James Helmore who represented 
the United Kingdom.388 Although many other nations participated in decision-
making, it has been said that the successful resolution of the negotiations 
was largely dependent on the United Kingdom and the United States.389  
While significant work was done to technically refine the text of the 
ITO Charter and the GATT, the bulk of the work had been completed in 
London and so few substantive changes were required.390 The use of 
quantitative restrictions, whether it be by developing countries for economic 
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development or for the remedy of balance-of-payment problems, remained a 
controversial issue.391 In addition, the most-favoured-clause had not been 
universally accepted with an Australian representative contesting its 
inclusion.392 However, there were only minor requests for amendment and 
the most-favoured-nation clause was ultimately agreed upon.393 Despite its 
misgivings, the United States did make some concessions and general 
consensus was ultimately reached on the formulation of both the GATT and 
the ITO Charter by August.394  
Essentially, the GATT was perceived to be an interim measure to 
ensure compliance with those tariff concessions already agreed upon before 
the ITO Charter came into effect.395 However, despite the aforementioned 
consensus having been reached on the GATT and ITO Charter, the actual 
content of the proposed tariff reductions had not yet been decided.396 While 
the United States boldly put forward the tariff reductions it had been 
authorised to make, other countries were not as forthcoming and there was a 
deadlock in negotiations.397 For example, with regards to raw wool, the 
Americans were not authorised to make any tariff concessions which 
angered the Australians who were hoping to benefit from more favourable 
tariffs.398 In order to streamline the progress made at the conference, 
President Truman authorised that the wool tariff be reduced by 25 per cent 
despite facing serious opposition from Congress.399  
Predictably, the most contentious issue remained imperial 
preferences.400 There was still significant tension between the United 
Kingdom and the United States over how to balance the reduction of 
American tariffs and the elimination of British preferences amongst the 
Dominions.401 Many commented that Helmore and Cripps were being 
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unreasonably stubborn on the issue of preferences and failed to exhibit a 
genuine commitment to the tariff negotiations at Geneva and to the long-term 
trade policy objectives.402 Old vested interests in imperial preferences 
remained strong and the United Kingdom was unwilling to take the political 
risk of abandoning such ties.403  
Despite having made so much progress, some still doubted whether 
the free trade project would be realised, in particular because of deteriorating 
Anglo-American relations.404 Will Clayton was under pressure domestically to 
secure the elimination of imperial preferences and discriminatory trading.405 
Others in the State Department were concerned about the potential fallout 
should Clayton stick steadfastly to his demand for the total elimination of 
preferences.406 Sir Stafford Cripps, on the other side of the negotiating table, 
was equally stubborn in his defense of the United Kingdom retaining its 
preferences.407 This was perhaps a consequence of the severe economic 
issues faced by the United Kingdom following World War II, as well as some 
remaining hostility over the manner in which the loan negotiations had played 
out in 1945.408  
Given this context, it is not surprising that the British negotiators were 
reluctant to concede anything to the United States  and, indeed, began 
backtracking on the agreement reached.409 Some have suggested that, 'The 
strong defense of imperial preferences could be read as reflecting fears 
about Britain’s diminishing role as a world power.'410 There was a shifting 
balance of power as the United Kingdom was perceived to be retreating in 
the midst of its economic difficulties and clinging to its Commonwealth ties as 
the vestiges of its former power.411 In this political vacuum, the United States 
expanded its global commitments both politically and economically.412  
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Concerns around the state of the United Kingdom’s economy, as well 
as the broader European continent, forced the Americans to act somewhat 
conservatively in making their demands in the tariff negotiations.413 Indeed, 
the formulation of the Marshall Plan in 1947 prompted Clayton to reconsider 
the renewed importance of the negotiations at Geneva as he perceived the 
successful provision of financial aid to promote recovery as being closely 
interlinked with securing a strong multilateral trade system.414  
The tariff negotiations were still underway at the end of August 
1947.415 American optimism about reaching final consensus was declining, 
prompting Clayton to suggest that negotiations with the United Kingdom 
should be terminated and agreements should be secured with the other 
nations on a multilateral basis.416 This was rejected by President Truman 
who instead decided to accept a less than substantial elimination of imperial 
preferences from the United Kingdom.417 This decision to allow the United 
Kingdom to largely retain its imperial preferences set the Geneva 
negotiations back on track, with tariff negotiations concluding in October 
1947.418 
In December 1947, President Truman issued a proclamation which 
made the GATT effective in the United States from 1 January 1948.419  He 
expressed unconditional enthusiasm for the GATT and remarked that the 
establishment of the GATT constituted an important juncture in the historical 
development of international economic relations.420 Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King of Canada, similarly, praised the GATT as an 
unprecedented achievement and one of extensive importance for Canada’s 
national welfare.421 In the United Kingdom, however, there was less 
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enthusiasm about the outcome of the conference.422 Nevertheless, the 
President of the Board of Trade believed that the agreements reached were 
fair and that whatever concessions had been made in terms of tariff 
reductions and preferences were balanced against equivalent concessions 
made by other participating nations.423  
At the most basic level, the Geneva conference achieved the 
finalisation of the GATT and commenced its implementation in the form of 
concrete tariff and preference reductions and binding tariff rates.424 At the 
first Geneva round, the agreements reached by the participating nations 
included numerous tariff items and covered a significant portion of 
international trade.425 While perhaps these tariff reductions did not have an 
immediate impact on trade because of some residual trade barriers that still 
needed to be phased out, the symbolic achievement cannot be 
overstated.426  
The infamous failure of the proposed ITO shifted a great deal of 
responsibility onto the GATT and its function in regulating international 
trade.427 While initially the GATT was perceived to be an interim arrangement 
to eventually be replaced by the ITO, it became increasingly clear as the 
Havana conference progressed that there was little chance of achieving 
consensus on the ITO Charter.428 Curzon remarked on how fortuitous this 
was because the most important facets of multilateralism persisted without 
being weighed down by rigid rules which may have hindered the workability 
of the international trade regime.429 Others, however, were not as optimistic. 
Take Richard Gardner who thought that the impermanence with which the 
GATT was developed, especially reflected in its lack of administrative 
frameworks, would limit the extent to which the project of international 
economic integration could be realised.430  
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This brief retelling of the negotiating history of the GATT reveals how 
sensitive the process was, and how easily it could have been derailed.431 
This is clearly a result of the particular context in which such negotiations 
took place as well as of the key players involved in the negotiating 
process.432 One can certainly start to see how the United States advanced its 
domestic interests in conjunction with its growing political and economic 
power. Despite the fact that the United States was more economically 
powerful and aware of its political leadership, it was not yet in a position to 
wholly dominate negotiations and there are multiple examples of the United 
States compromising in response to demands by other countries.433 Most 
notably, the United Kingdom could pressurise the United States into backing 
down on the issue of its preferential trading relationship with the Dominions 
as the United Kingdom repeatedly emphasised the lack of domestic support 
for the elimination of imperial preferences.434 The interplay between these 
powers as they experienced disparate economic trajectories and unique 
domestic constraints is extremely useful insofar as it provides insight into 
how a critical engagement with the negotiating history of the GATT can 
generate important information about how principles such as non-
discrimination in trade and the most-favoured-nation principle were intended 




4.1 The drafting of the GATT 
 
Having discussed the more general historical trend which led up to the 
finalisation of the GATT, it now stands to discuss the specific drafting 
processes as applicable to the development of the GATT. This brief analysis 
will reemphasise the notion that engaging in a comprehensive historical 
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investigation of the origins of a particular text, of the kind undertaken in 
Chapter 3 (and to be further undertaken in Chapter 4), is an important 
exercise which reveals, in this particular case, the more practical significance 
of why the most-favoured-nation principle was incorporated into the GATT in 
the specific manner and form which it was. 
As has already been covered in Chapter 3, the formulation of the 
GATT took place through negotiations held by the Preparatory Committee of 
the ITO between 1946 and 1948.435 The United Nations' Economic and 
Social Council appointed the Preparatory Committee which subsequently 
appointed a Drafting Committee as well as many working committees.436 The 
most important of these working committees for our purposes is Committee II 
on General Commercial Policy which dealt with many of the GATT 
provisions.437 Representatives from all the countries sitting on the 
Preparatory Committee were entitled to send delegates to participate in 
Committee II.438 Throughout this process, there was significant overlap 
between negotiations on the ITO and on the GATT, primarily because the 
GATT was perceived as an interim agreement.439 
The first negotiations on the GATT occurred at the conference in 
London in 1946 where the outlines of the relationship between the GATT and 
the ITO began to take form.440 The starting point for the Preparatory 
Committee was the aforementioned "Suggested Charter" which had been 
designed by the United States in advance of the conference.441 The 
"Suggested Charter" was, in effect, a summary of the consultations between 
the United Kingdom and the United States which provided a basis upon 
which participating nations could respond to the proposed provisions.442 
However, the consequences of delegates agreeing on particular provisions 
of the "Suggested Charter" were limited because they did not have the legal 
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authority to bind their governments and so further meetings were required to 
secure such agreement.443 
It is worth commenting on some of the decisions made at the London 
Conference insofar as they pertain to exceptions to non-discrimination. 
Notably, on the issue of preferences which would be afforded some limited 
allowances under the GATT, it was agreed that the definition of 'preferences' 
would include both long-standing preferences (such as the imperial 
preferences) and short-term contractual arrangements.444 In addition, 
customs unions that were already formed and that may be formed in the 
future were not subject to the most-favoured-nation clause.445 Indeed, at the 
London Conference, the general attitude towards the most-favoured-nation 
clause was to restrict the scope of its application.446 For example, in respect 
of its treatment of government procurement, there was an obligation to abide 
by the most-favoured-nation principle under the "Suggested Charter" but this 
was eliminated in the negotiations in London.447 
A great deal of progress was made and the negotiators decided that 
the matter of multilateral tariff negotiations should be pursued further at a 
separate meeting.448 The ideas expressed in the "Suggested Charter" about 
the GATT serving as an international agreement on reducing tariffs through 
multilateral negotiations and eliminating discriminatory trade practices were 
predominantly retained.449 The notion was that it would be beneficial to have 
an agreement which gave effect to some of the provisions in the proposed 
ITO Charter but which would become operational before the Organisation.450 
The result would be that the tariff reductions agreed upon would not need to 
be put to one side while the remaining negotiations on the ITO continued.451 
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Rather the tariff reductions, in combination with the provisions on commercial 
policy, would form the GATT and be implemented more speedily.452   
Discussions on the GATT were continued in New York in 1947 where 
the first draft of the GATT was written.453 These assumptions about the 
temporary nature of the GATT shaped its text as drafters were careful to 
exclude institutional provisions and provisions on topics which would later be 
governed by the ITO Charter.454 Thus, in New York, another draft of the 
Charter was created alongside the first draft of the GATT.455 The New York 
draft of the GATT did not differ significantly from the provisions proposed in 
London, however the abovementioned distinction became clearer in the 
terminology used.456 That is, for example, the ITO Charter had 'member 
states' and the GATT had 'contracting parties.'457 This indicated the different 
purposes intended for the GATT and ITO, with the former seen as an interim, 
multilateral contractual agreement and the latter as a fully-fledged 
international organisation.458  
The first draft of the GATT would be adjusted further and finalised at 
the Geneva Conference by the Drafting Committee in conjunction with the 
Preparatory Committee.459 This conference would also mark the first round of 
tariff negotiations where parties would agree on reductions in their tariff 
rates.460 The culmination of these efforts was recorded in the Geneva Final 
Act, incorporating both the final draft of the GATT as well as the results of the 
tariff negotiations.461 The Final Act would be enforced in terms of the 
Protocol of Provisional Application which provided that governments ought to 
apply Parts I and III which dealt with tariff concessions, the most-favoured-
nation clause and other administrative issues.462 Part II, which dealt with 
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national treatment, non-tariff barriers to trade and exceptions would be 
applied where it did not conflict with existing legislation.463 
The GATT negotiations concluded towards the end of 1947 and the 
GATT became officially operational on 1 January 1948 in the manner 
described above.464 There were few changes made to the draft, however the 
text was given greater legitimacy because the negotiators in Geneva were 
official representatives who could bind their government to the commitments 
in the GATT.465 Article XXIX elucidated the interrelationship between the ITO 
and the GATT by establishing that if the ITO should not come into force or no 
longer be in force, then the GATT's contracting parties should meet and 
decide whether to amend, supplement or maintain the GATT.466  
Of course, the ITO would never enter into force and the GATT would 
take on a far more significant role in regulating international trade than 
initially anticipated. Even to the degree that the GATT was expected to 
function as a temporary arrangement, the drafting negotiations reveal a great 
deal about contemporary power dynamics and the respective agendas of the 
negotiating parties. In particular, discussions around how the negotiating 
parties came to agree upon including the most-favoured-nation clause as 
well as its exception for imperial preferences in the text of the GATT provides 
insight into how the United Kingdom and the United States pursued certain 
domestic interests and attempted to assert their respective visions of the 
future world trading order. By engaging with such dynamics one gains an 
appreciation of how the application of principles such as non-discrimination 
in trade is so context-dependent. What has become increasingly clear as we 
have traced the negotiating history of the GATT is that, while the United 
States was experiencing an upward trajectory of economic growth and 
political power, the United Kingdom was still suffering the aftereffects of the 
two world wars and was trying to hold onto the last vestiges of its dominance. 
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This juxtaposition, and the implications it had for the drafting of the GATT, 




5.1 Manner in which the balance of power within the international 
sphere and divergent historical trajectories influenced the GATT 
negotiations 
 
Ruggie has argued that, 'to say anything sensible about the content of 
international economic orders and about the regimes that serve them it is 
necessary to look at how power and legitimate social purpose become fused 
to project political authority into the international system.'467 While this is an 
important point, many mainstream works lack the application of a similar 
approach to analyses of legal texts such as the GATT, the consequence of 
which being that such works are not able to provide a nuanced 
understanding of the principles underlying such texts.   
It is therefore the aim of this chapter to engage in a multi-layered 
investigation into the relevant historical context and dynamic hegemonic 
powers which influenced the ultimate codification of the GATT. In a sense, 
an evaluation of the tensions and contextual constraints experienced by the 
negotiators as well as the sacrifices and compromises made in order to save 
the future of the project, is an excellent indicator of contemporary values and 
the extent to which they are shared on an international scale. This, in turn, 
provides insight into the internal logic of the text of the GATT. 
The GATT's preamble describes its express objectives as improving 
living standards, securing full employment and developing world trade by 
reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers and eliminating discriminatory 
treatment.468 If one is to look more closely at how consensus was reached in 
                                                     
467 John Gerard Ruggie ‘International regimes, transactions and change: embedded 
liberalism in the postwar economic order’ (1982) 36 2 International Organization 379 at 382. 




respect of non-discrimination, for example, it is possible to identify more 
specific power dynamics which influence the exact formulation of such 
agreements. As has become clear, the United States capitalised on its 
increasingly dominant position within the international space and attempted 
to exert its influence over the process to secure increased market access for 
its domestic suppliers without having to reciprocate with extensive tariff 
reductions. By comparison, the United Kingdom was suffering the impact of 
its declining position in world politics and so was more insistent upon 
retaining its imperial preferences which it perceived as giving it an advantage 
within international trade. Because the United States did not yet hold 
sufficient hegemonic influence to completely monopolise the political space 
at the GATT negotiations, it needed to compromise so as to salvage the 
proceedings. 
Broadly speaking, most agree that the main motivator for the 
establishment of trade agreements is to boost national income by minimising 
trade barriers, improving terms of trade or expanding trade volumes.469 
However, such decisions are often constrained by domestic factors such as 
the political climate and the need to maintain support from or placate 
powerful lobbyist groups.470 With regards to the gains of entering into trade 
agreements, some authors assert that a distinction should be made between 
smaller and larger countries.471 A smaller country which cannot unilaterally 
dictate its terms of trade may benefit from entering into trade agreements 
because of the increased market access and positive effect on trade 
volumes.472 However, because of its negligible bargaining power, it is 
probably not able to effect a substantial change to import and export 
prices.473 With a larger country, it is suggested that the gains they may obtain 
from free trade may be lesser in the sense that reducing their tariffs may be 
at the expense of sacrificing the strength of their terms of trade.474 Their 
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superior bargaining power may, however, allow them to reap the benefits of 
other countries lowering tariffs without them agreeing to equivalent 
reductions.475 That is, a larger country could maintain its tariffs and those 
exporting to that country would be expected to lower their price and absorb 
part of the tariff, effectively reducing the price of imports.476  
Some have argued that this scenario explains the desire to enter into 
international trade agreements which are, 'driven by a desire to internalise a 
terms-of-trade externality between countries.'477 While higher trade barriers 
are designed to strengthen terms of trade, the gains of implementing such 
barriers tend to be minimal when faced with similar barriers imposed by other 
countries.478 The volume of trade is likely to decrease with little improvement 
in terms of trade to offset this loss.479 It is in such a context that acting 
multilaterally rather than unilaterally has a great appeal as countries acting in 
unison can avoid this 'inefficient equilibrium.'480  
Reaching the point where countries recognise the benefit of engaging 
in multilateral negotiations and are committed to reciprocal tariff reductions 
can be beleaguered with difficulties, as was observed in the GATT 
negotiations. Indeed, there have been criticisms of this argument put forward 
by Johnson in respect of the motivations for entering into international trade 
agreements on the basis that it assumes that governments are purely 
motivated by national welfare.481 Theorists such as Grossman and Helpman 
have developed an alternative model which perceives governments as 
balancing and combining national welfare with political self-interest as well as 
with the interests of organised industries who are powerful enough to lobby 
political support.482 Grossman and Helpman have further argued that trade 
agreements nevertheless have the potential to improve national welfare, 
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qualified by the country’s political objectives, because they are capable of 
addressing the issue of international terms of trade externality.483 Whether 
the terms of such trade agreements indeed serve national welfare depends 
on the extent to which 'joint welfare maximisation' features on the negotiating 
countries’ agendas.484  
If one considers American and British trade figures in the period 
preceding the GATT, it seems that their terms of trade were in a relatively 
healthy state and yet the volume of trade was in significant decline in the 
interwar period, especially during the Great Depression.485 In the aftermath 
of the Great Depression, domestic output recovered quite quickly whereas 
the volume of trade remained stagnant, most likely due to the protectionist 
policies of many countries in the early 1930s.486 Some authors have 
suggested that this negative impact on trade volumes may have prompted 
the United States and United Kingdom to begin thinking about entering into a 
multilateral trade agreement.487 That is, if countries cooperate to reduce 
trade barriers this may have little impact on terms of trade but may boost 
trade volumes to the mutual benefit of the participating nations.488 
Nevertheless, conceding ground on trade barriers may not be particularly 
palatable to domestic audiences, despite the reciprocal benefits secured as a 
result thereof.489 
An additional example of such motivations manifesting in the GATT 
negotiations would be the narratives that were widely expressed at the 
Bretton Woods conference where the transatlantic negotiators disagreed 
about the continued appropriateness of imperial preferences.490 American 
officials were ultimately concerned about how such preferential 
arrangements inhibited American suppliers from entering colonial markets 
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and wished for their wholesale elimination.491 Their determination to push the 
British to eliminate imperial preferences was based on the hope that it would 
minimise discrimination against American exports in the markets of their 
biggest trading partners, the United Kingdom and Canada.492 For example, 
consider Canadian import tariffs in 1946 which were 6.6 per cent vis-à-vis 
British imports and 12.9 per cent vis-à-vis American imports.493 The United 
States was greatly motivated by this situation and perceived the 
establishment of the GATT as a possible means to address the 
discriminatory tariff treatment it faced.494 
The United Kingdom, however, was unwilling to sacrifice their 
preferential access without securing what they considered to be an 
equivalent concession in the form of a substantial reduction in American 
tariffs. While the United States wished to capitalise on its strong bargaining 
position, it was not able to exert sufficient influence to shift the British 
negotiators from their position. 
This example is useful to the extent that it demonstrates the manner in 
which each nation wished to retain the strength of their terms of trade and 
were unwilling to relinquish their existing advantages. In doing so, the 
potential gains to be made in maintaining trade barriers would be somewhat 
inconsequential when faced with similar trade barriers in other markets. It is 
because the United States was not yet sufficiently powerful to completely 
dictate the nature of the proposed world trading order so as to maintain its 
tariffs and indirectly coerce others into absorbing the additional cost that they 
needed to compromise. Despite the United Kingdom's declining power, it had 
sufficient influence to effectively contest the proposed text of the GATT 
resulting in the inclusion of certain exceptions to the most-favoured-nation 
clause. Perhaps most importantly, the multilateral character of the proposed 
trade regime was such that it allowed nations to feel secure in agreeing to 
reductions in trade barriers without fearing that other nations would not 
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reciprocate and would instead establish an anticompetitive trade 
environment. 
Baldwin has asserted that, indeed, the motivators behind the GATT 
were political and economic.495 In this regard, Kindleberger has argued that 
one may attain a stable international economic order if there is a hegemonic 
power willing to bear some of the costs of providing certain public goods, 
including a liberal trade regime, in order to prevent conflict from arising.496 
Some have questioned this portrayal of a supposedly altruistic hegemonic 
power as being misleading and, in fact, such powers are more likely to 
structure policies to serve their own interests rather than the interests of 
others.497 Certainly, in respect of the participation of the United States in the 
GATT negotiations, many felt that the free trade regime would 
disproportionately favour the United States as their goods would benefit from 
greater market access and yet they would not need to make any substantial 
concessions in respect of lowering their own tariffs. This is echoed in the 
argument that free trade policies are often favoured by nations experiencing 
significant economic growth as they increasingly seek more expansive 
market access.498 Nevertheless, the United States' ability to capitalise on 
their role as a strong hegemonic power was limited in some respects. 
If one examines the United States' participation in the negotiations 
preceding the GATT, it is clear that they were emerging as an important 
international leader.499 American hegemony arose following the conclusion of 
the Second World War as the level of conflict as well as the absence of 
organisation grew to such an extent that a vacuum was created, requiring a 
new set of rules and norms.500 Because of this increasing demand for order 
and because the United States emerged from wartime in a greater shape 
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than other competing core states, such as the United Kingdom, it was in a 
position to fulfil that demand and therefore take on a more prominent role.501 
An interesting feature of American hegemony at this time was that it was 
characterised by norms and values which had become widely acceptable.502 
Nevertheless, they were seldom able to exploit such leadership in any 
practicable sense and instead were obliged to compromise on many different 
issues including the United Kingdom’s retention of imperial preferences.503 
Framing this as the United States’ attempt at flexing its international 
economic muscles to establish a trade agreement that purely served its own 
interests is an oversimplification of the power dynamics and, in fact, 
overlooks the widespread belief that the interdependency necessitated by 
free trade was key to international political stability.504 Such trade 
agreements necessarily arise out of negotiations, disagreements and 
compromises and encompass various diverse interests, both self-serving 
and altruistic.  
Indeed, both these parties were pursuing international peace and 
stability for which they were willing to make certain economic concessions.505 
This idea was vigorously supported by Cordell Hull who said that, 'The truth 
is universally recognised that trade between nations is the greatest peace-
maker and civiliser within human experience.'506 Indeed, this idea garnered 
extensive support in the international community, especially from those 
countries who had suffered significant losses during World War II and wished 
to avoid such conflict in the future.507 Sir Stafford Cripps of the United 
Kingdom similarly perceived the GATT and the ITO as constituting a 
significant step away from hazardous unilateral policies and towards 
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multilateral cooperation.508 Wilcox of the United States echoed these 
sentiments and perceived with optimism the role of the multilateral trading 
system in bringing forth a new era of international stability.509 
It would seem that there were in fact diverse factors motivating the 
establishment of a free trade regime including to increase trade volumes, 
internalise terms of trade externalities and promote a more stable 
international order.510 As the emerging hegemonic power, the United States 
had an important role in giving institutional form to such ideals. To the extent 
that it wished to unilaterally impose its own vision of the multilateral trade 
regime which served its own domestic interests, it was constrained as it 
needed other nations to accept this vision within the hierarchical and 
hegemonic structure of international decision-making.511 Indeed, as has been 
argued, while the United States could control certain elements of this 
decision-making process, it still required support from the other nations. To 
that extent, it can be said that the meaning of the GATT is truly intersectional 
and contested and, ultimately, reflects a negotiated compromise within 
contemporary power hierarchies. These are the types of insights which can 
only be gained through a thorough investigation of the historical context in 
which principles such as the most-favoured-nation principle are incorporated 






The GATT emerged in the wake of the Second World War when 
international leaders were intent on securing a more stable world order.512 It 
was thought that the introduction of such an institution which regulated the 
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liberalisation of trade would increase commercial interconnectedness and 
shared prosperity, ultimately discouraging further conflict through 
interdependency.513 The manner in which it went about doing so was through 
negotiating the mutual reduction of tariffs between member states, 
complemented by a set of rules controlling the manner in which such states 
could intervene in international trade.514 This involved eliminating many 
forms of non-tariff trade barriers, committing to reduce tariff barriers and 
ensuring that all member states benefit from most-favoured-nation 
treatment.515  
Ultimately, it has been determined that the GATT has, 'encouraged 
governments to take a more international approach and … strengthened the 
hands of outward-looking leaders in dealing with domestic political 
opposition.'516 Many of the points of conflict which seemed near 
insurmountable in the heat of the negotiations would later diminish in 
importance owing either to changes in British or American domestic politics 
or to being overtaken by more pressing events.517 While each nation's 
negotiators often stubbornly insisted on certain self-serving principles to 
satisfy domestic public opinion, the GATT was later supported by sufficient 
common interest which facilitated the practical implementation of its 
policies.518  
It is clear from the historical arc outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 that the 
GATT forms an integral part of the evolution of the ideas of internationalism 
and multilateralism which developed alongside greater economic integration. 
In order to fully understand its nature, this dissertation has embraced a 
contextualised approach that acknowledges and accounts for the manner in 
which the GATT evolved from, 'the intersection of customs, traditions, values 
and perceptions of reality…of the persons and groups who are prominent in 
the events that make up this evolution.'519 In doing so, this author has 
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engaged with the paradigm of Gramsci's concept of historical materialism 
(and Robert Cox's subsequent extension of this concept to accommodate the 
emergence of international institutions) so as to assess the manner in which 
legal concepts such as the most-favoured-nation clause are a product of the 
circumstances in which they were drafted and reflect a negotiated 
compromise between hegemonic interests.520  
In applying this theoretical framework to the historical developments 
traversed in Chapters 3 and 4, it became clear from the discussions in 
Chapter 5 that the final codification of the GATT as well as the incorporation 
of the most-favoured-nation clause more specifically constituted a negotiated 
compromise between the United States' desire to expand market access for 
domestic suppliers and the United Kingdom's insistence upon retaining the 
benefits of its imperial preferences. While American policy-makers and 
politicians hoped to capitalise on the United States' increasing power, it was 
not able to unilaterally impose its opinions upon the text of the GATT. This is, 
of course, just one of many contextual nuances which may be drawn from 
the nature of the negotiations but it proves particularly interesting because of 
what it reveals about the respective nations' trajectories. On a broader 
theoretical level, it also provides insight into the degree to which the GATT, 
as an institution and as a legal text, is embedded within particular social, 
economic and political structures which may, to varying degrees, reflect 
global hegemonic strategies.521 
History-making constitutes, 'a complex and dialectical interplay 
between agency, structure, consciousness and action.'522 As such, any 
attempt to assess a legal text such as the GATT in isolation of contemporary 
international political dynamics as well as relevant domestic factors which 
either empower or constrain political actors to make certain decisions would 
be of limited value. It is unfortunately this flaw which has characterised some 
mainstream works. It is hoped that this dissertation has evaded such 
superficial discourse and has instead engaged with the negotiating history of 
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the GATT in a critical and holistic manner so as to uncover a more nuanced 
understanding of the most-favoured-nation clause and the GATT. In addition, 
such an analytical exercise exhibits the utility of engaging with the historical 
origins of legal texts more generally so as to better comprehend the 
intentions with which they were created.  
And what of the nature and interpretation of the GATT and its most-
favoured-nation clause today? The limited scope of this dissertation does not 
permit a detailed consideration of the current state of the multilateral trade 
regime, but suffice to say that it is facing serious legitimacy challenges in a 
world where many nations are reverting to more nationalist and protectionist 
foreign policies. Mazower, for example, has commented that, 'We have 
moved from an era that had faith in the idea of international institutions to 
one that has lost it.'523 The continued relevance of many international trade 
mechanisms has been seriously contested and there is no longer the same 
political impetus driving adherence to the principles of reciprocity and non-
discrimination within the international trade space. Far from the forward-
looking optimism which characterised the initial drafting of the GATT, more 
recent narratives instead bemoan the disintegration of the underlying 
principles of free trade.  
Because international instruments such as the GATT are both the 
result of the contemporary hegemonic forces at play during its conception as 
well as a further facilitator of such forces, they have a remarkably malleable 
character which is an endless source of academic inspiration. This evolving 
role of the GATT and of the most-favoured-nation clause offers an interesting 
opportunity for subsequent research into the contested nature of legal 
concepts and the manner in which their interpretation is dependent on 
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